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Title:	ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN KADUNA AND PLATEAU STATES:
Keyword:	
Description:	A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF RELIGION & CULTURAL STUDIES, FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA NSUKKA
Category:	RELIGION & CULTURAL STUDIES
Publisher:	
Publication Date:	MAY, 2011
Signature:	Webmaster <small>Digitally Signed by Webmaster's Name DN : CN = Webmaster's name O= University of Nigeria, Nsukka OU = Innovation Centre</small>

**ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN KADUNA AND
PLATEAU STATES: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT
IN NIGERIA**

BY

**ALONG JOHN YAHAYA
PG/Ph D/08/48308**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF RELIGION &
CULTURAL STUDIES, FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA NSUKKA**

SUPERVISOR: REV. PROF. A. U. AGHA

MAY, 2011

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RELIGION & CULTURAL STUDIES, FACULTY OF THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA NSUKKA,
IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR
THE AWARD OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN
RELIGION AND SOCIETY**

MAY, 2011

DECLARATION

I, Yahaya A.J. a Postgraduate student of the Department of Religion, University of Nigeria, Nsukka with Reg. No: PG/Ph.D/08/48308 has satisfactorily completed all the requirements of the research works for the award of Ph.D. Degree in Religion and Society.

The work embodied in this project to the best of my knowledge is original and has not been in any way submitted in part or full for any other Degree or Diploma of this University or any other University.

DEDICATION

This project is dedicated to my beloved wife Grace Yahaya, my daughters-Patience and Esther Yahaya and my late Parents (Mr/Mrs Lekwot A.T.s).

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Sincere thanks goes to my project supervisor Rev. Prof A.U. Agha for spending much of his time despite his tight schedules to ensure that this research work was successful. He is a father, friend and a brother whose inspiration and motivations can not be forgotten. May the Good Lord continue to grant him good health protection and success in all his endeavours.

Thanks and appreciation to the entire academic and non teaching staff members of the Department of Religion & Cultural Studies most especially the present Head of the Department Rev. Fr. Dr H.C. Achunike, for their kindness and friendliness to me during the programme. May the good Lord also continue to shower his blessings and protection on them now and forever, Amen.

Thanks also to my entire course mates for their moral support for this research work, and those who provided me with information and other materials during the interviews conducted for the purpose of this research work.

In a very special way, special appreciation and gratitude to my wife Mrs. Grace Yahaya and my children – Patience and Esther Yahaya who were never tired of praying for my successful completion of this programme.

Finally, and above all, thanks, glory and honour to God Almighty for his kindness upon me throughout the programme. May His Name be glorified forever, Amen.

ABSTRACT

The research problem of this study is “Ethnic and religious conflicts in Kaduna and Plateau States and their Implications for the Socio- Economic and political development of Nigeria”. The incessant ethnic and religious conflicts have become a major problem confronting the two states and the nation at large. The conflicts have resulted to the death of many Nigerians and the loss of property worth billions of naira. This has led to the expression of disappointment by well meaning people within and outside Nigeria. The researcher therefore researched into the root and remote causes of these conflicts. That was done through the historical method. Data was obtained from primary sources through oral interviews as they relate to the research topic. Six randomly selected local governments in Kaduna State and six Local Government Areas in Plateau State were used for the study. Secondary sources like the Library and Archives were consulted for data. The Internet was equally a great source of information for the study. Findings reveal that the root and remote courses of the ethno-religious conflicts are tied to the Sharia law, intolerance, indigene/settler syndrome, unemployment, poverty, unguided utterances of Religious and Political Leaders, lack of proper education, and absence of good governance among others. The conflicts by implication have resulted in the irreparable loss of human and material resources that could have been useful for social and economic developmental purposes of the nation. The conflicts have also posed serious consequences on the nation’s political system as it affects democratic values and norms. The researcher by way of conclusion hoped that sincere governmental schemes and efforts be established to achieve social, economic and political distributive justice for all people in the country. With that the incessant conflicts shall be controlled.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the study

Ethnic consciousness is the loyalty or attachment to an ethnic group either as a social, political and economic entity, or a cultural community. Whichever way we look at it, ethnic consciousness is based on the distinctiveness of one's group as opposed to other groups.

Ethnic consciousness is not detrimental to process of national integration in a nation state. In fact, it can be argued that every individual needs this form of consciousness for his or her own identity. The fact that one is Ibo, Yoruba, Kataf, Hausa, Idoma, Fulani, English, etc is a basic fact of identity. However, Ethnic consciousness can be easily exploited by competing elites or politicians for other purposes. That is why Elaigwu (2004:3) observed that:

When highly educated Nigerians like Nnamdi Azikiwe, who was Nigeria's first president, goes back to his village to take a traditional chieftaincy title, he is responding to decolonizing aspect of modernization as he seeks identification with his base of identity, Onitsha. The new awareness of his cultural obligations and rights among his own group is only a demonstration of ethnic consciousness.

On the other hand, ethnic consciousness can be transformed into a weapon of offence or defense in a competitive process in relation to other groups over desired scarce resources. This could lead to the mobilization of ethnic bedfellows in order to maximize gains at the expense of the other competing group(s). Ethnicity could create problems of integration, especially in a

multinational state. Ethnicity, like religion, is an issue of primordial identity, and could easily be subjected to mobilization by actors for group cause.

Religion on the other hand, is a very emotive issue. It is a matter of primordial identity and means different things to different people. In some societies, it has taken ideological coloration to the extent that it provides a guide for faith, action and evaluation in private and public life; in others, it guides only private life. Bunnet (2009:5), opine that:

Religion for Nigerian people is a set of beliefs and practices based on faith, which are sacred and defy rational scrutiny. Therefore, it can quite easily trigger off emotional reactions. Religion also makes the world more predictable, the vicissitudes of life more tolerable and its complexities more understandable. It provides psychological relief and inspiration for the individual. At the social level, it provides a medium for fellowship and mutual support.

Conflicts are unavoidable aspects of human interaction. They arise from the pursuit of divergent interests, goals and aspirations by individuals or groups. Changes in the socio-political environment provide fertile grounds for conflicts involving individuals and groups probably interested in using these conflicts to achieve their selfish goals. Therefore, the negative exploitation of ethnicity and religion results into ethno-religious conflicts. These often arise out of mistrust, hostility, polarization of relations among groups and at times in a competitive setting. All conflicts, according to Elaigwu (2004:4) regiment primordial identities of a group in a competitive relation with other groups are regarded as ethno-religious conflicts. The history of conflicts in the Northern part of Nigeria clearly illustrates the above point. This is because, the Kafanchan

conflict of March 1987 as an example, started as religious conflict but ended up as an ethnic conflict. The 1991 market fight between individuals in Tafawa Balewa took on religious coloring, spreading as far as Bauchi town. Similarly, the 2001 Jos fight that started as an ethnic conflict ended up as a religious conflict. The North has had a very large share of ethno– religious brand of conflicts especially since the Maitatsine conflict of 1980 to the recent times.

Religious experiences are one of the most important experiences of mankind the world over, and every religion claims among other things, to be an agent of peace. Such claims seem to be true to some extent. That is why Asaju (1988:128) asserted that, “although, religious experiences differ, but one fact is that all people are affiliated to one Supreme Being, that is God who is worship under different names among different tribes of the world”. It is on these bases that the Nigerian constitution recognizes three religions. These are: Christianity, Islam and African Traditional Religion. The practice of the African Traditional Religion in Nigeria before the advent of Christianity and Islam was very peaceful and accommodating because there was no any external influence or unhealthy rivalry among the Traditional Religious Cults. That is why Islam which came into Nigeria at the later part of the 14th century, and Christianity which finally settled in Nigeria in the middle of 18th century were both accommodated by the traditional religion. The toleration exhibited by the Nigerian indigenous religion was not in any way reciprocated by Islam and Christianity. The advent of the two religions rather made the indigenous

religion to begin to recede to the background. As a result, most people (Nigerians) identify themselves as either Christians or Muslims. Furthermore, Kukah and Achebe cited in Achunike (2007:3) observed that “both Christianity and Islam today straddle across the Nigerian polity without apologies and are aggressively proselytized”. This has led to a serious rivalry between Christians and Muslims. That is why Ahmadu in Achunike (2007:3) also stated that:

The presence of oriental religions in Nigeria thrust a discordant note into the serene religious atmosphere. Throughout the history of their developments, Islam and Christianity have existed in mutual hostility. Though, emerging from the same roots with almost identical literature and tenets, their strides for proslytization have often been marked by violence and intolerance.

Some writers have also observed that religion which has become an inextricable reality of the Nigerian society, be it (Christianity, Islam or the African Traditional Religion), and which is supposed to encourage peaceful co-existence, unity, morality and a sanitized society, has failed to achieve that. Rather, religion has become the same vehicle for transportation of envy, strife and resultant physical conflicts between and among relations and societal neighbours. Religion, the expected unifying force of the Nigerian society is now used as a force that is tearing it apart.

Therefore, like it has been rightly observed above, the increasing rate of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria in the past and in the recent years shows that the adherents of the two major religions (Christianity and Islam) are not in

good terms. Nigeria has witnessed several ethno–religious conflicts. These sad developments made Ozigbo (1993:52) to remark that:

It is the inability of the federal, state and local government authorities to play fair and neutral roles in religious matters and in the provision of basic life necessities that tend to exacerbate ethno–religious rivalry and politics leading to conflicts in the country.

These are witnessed during the last three decades (1980–2010) where several ethno–religious conflicts in Nigeria have negatively affected the socio–economic and political growth of the country. Some of these conflicts include:

- the 1980–1982 Maitatsine religious conflict in Kano;
- the 1987 Kafanchan ethno–religious conflict;
- the 1992 Zangon Kataf ethno–religious crises;
- the 1998–2000 conflict in Okitipupa area of Ondo state;
- the 1999 conflict between the Hausas and the Yorubas in Shagamu;
- the 1999–2000 conflict in Kano;
- the 1999–2002 Wukari, Takum, Taraba/Benue States’ conflicts;
- the 2000 Aguleri and Umuleri Inter-communal conflict in Anambra state;
- the 2000–2001 conflict in Burutu Local Government of Delta state;
- the 2000–2001 Modakeke conflict in Osun state;
- the 2005 Jos Yelwa Shandam ethno–religious conflicts;
- the 2008–2011 ethno–religious and political conflicts in Jos Plateau and Bauchi States.

As a result, serious threats are posed to political, social and economic activities in the country. These, we have witnessed in the number of lives lost and property worth millions of Naira often destroyed at will during such violent conflicts.

Therefore, ethno-religious conflicts have become one of the major problems affecting the social, economic and political development of Nigeria in these recent years. These conflicts tend to undermine the sacredness of man's relationship with God, which calls for the love of one another irrespective of men's differences in religious beliefs or affiliation.

Culturally, Nigeria is a heterogeneous society. So, during the pre-colonial era, there were three major distinct autonomous cultural groups in the country (the Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba) and each group with its own religio-political dispositions. However, the two major religions in Nigeria: Christianity and Islam favours' monotheism. As a result, during the colonial period and due to the embargo placed on missionary enterprise in the northern emirates for about half of their entire stay, there was no religious provocation between Christianity and Islam.

However, soon after independence, with an understanding that guaranteed freedom of association and conscience, the stage was ripe for a greater level of interaction between Christians and the Muslims. Again, not only that religion was dragged into the nation's political sphere, but struggle for pre-eminence ushered in the unfortunate experience of each of the two major

religions (Christianity and Islam) struggling to be at the center for their groups interests. Kukah (1993:10), viewing the situation as an unfortunate one described it thus: “both religions are straddled across the Nigerian polity, each no longer knocking and pleading to be admitted, but seeking to take over the architectural design and construction of the Nigerian polity”. Continuing, Kukah (1993:12) further observed that:

In Northern Nigeria, the ruling class made no efforts towards making any concession to the south, so as to achieve power, mainly because it has always seen itself as having the required numerical advantage to hold on to power as the means of political participation.

This development has therefore plunged the country into serious ethno-religious divide and conflicts between Christians and Muslims.

Ethno-religious and other forms of sectarian struggles and conflicts are on the rise recently in Nigeria. The return of democracy with accompanying respect for fundamental human rights seemed to have unleashed all the tensions that have accumulated over the years. Of recent, deepest attachments have tended to shift more in favour of ethnic-based tendencies as ethnicity and religiocentrism occupies more space in the social and political landscape of the Nigerian society. This trend has been intensified and made more complicated by unpopular policies and bad governance in the past and even at this present time.

The two states, Kaduna and Plateau, are located in the highlands of Central Nigeria. They belong to the Central States of Nigeria otherwise called

the “Middle Belt”, a geo-political term with a lot of ethno-religious connotations comprising the states of Bauchi, Benue, Kaduna, Nassarawa, Plateau and Taraba. These states have unique characteristics vis-à-vis other states in the federation. A special report by the National Orientation Agency (NOA, 2002) identifies these features in the zone to include:

- (1) Home to over 50% of ethnic groups in Nigeria; although no ethnic groups shares 100% of its culture with other groups;
- (2) Christianity, Islam and Traditional African Religion all command considerable influence on the lives of the people.
- (3) Apart from the rich mineral resources, the zone is also endowed with massive land and grazing activities, explaining the massive influx of people from other areas to this zone;
- (4) In terms of development, the zone is one of the least developed in spite of the location of the federal capital close to the zone;
- (5) The zone has a very large pool of ex-servicemen, some of who are not gainfully employed;
- (6) The people of this zone are known to be hospitable, accommodating and peaceful. It is indeed worrisome that such a people could suddenly be engaged in frequent violent clashes (National Orientation Agency, 2002).

However, Kaduna and Plateau states are particularly viewed as rainbows of vibrant diversity; and mini Nigeria with about 47–52 ethnic groups in each, Muslim and Christian populations. It should also be noted that Kaduna and Jos Plateau as the capitals of the two states have always played host to a variety of interests from both the North and even beyond who always rightly or wrongly,

believe that the two states are places from which messages of whatever hue and cry could be effectively conveyed to the entire country. The convergence of these factors in the two states no doubt have contributed to the development of the states, but has also put a lot of strain on the systems as it has now and then been found handy by some mischievous and misguided elements among Christians and Muslims who exploit them for the attainment of their selfish and often nefarious objectives. Such individuals and groups often pretend to be pursuing public or communal interests.

The two states however do not have the monopoly of being the flashpoint or theater of ethno-religious tensions and conflicts. Elsewhere in Nigeria and indeed throughout the world, contemporary events and political processes provide ample evidence that even the developed societies are not free from the deadly explosions and violent confrontation along ethnic, religious, regional, economic, cultural and other divisions.

What makes the difference from one area to the other is the question of the degree of the conflicts and, perhaps more importantly, the efforts being made to address the basis of the problems related to the conflicts. Whereas in some places mechanisms have been put in place to tackle the problems, in others, nothing is being correctly done, therefore leaving the problems to find concrete expressions in the most violent form.

Plurality of ethnic and religious groups, ideally, should not be a problem. Diversity and pluralism are known to be the basis of cosmopolitan and complex

societies and other cultures. However, the mismanagement of these factors by controllers of political power often breed sectarian and other conflicts. The multi ethno–religious nature of the society therefore is not the problem. It is only when ethnicity and religion are made means of narrowing people’s participation in political, economic, and social spheres that problems manifest in various forms.

The two states under discussion (Kaduna and Plateau) geopolitical areas have for sometime occupied positions of volatility in the history of ethno–religious tensions and conflicts in Nigeria, with eruptions from the states having great consequences nationwide. The states have experienced varieties of conflicts - Sometimes subtle and at other times violent – mostly expressed in ethno–religious forms. Bad leadership at both macro and micro levels has also played a major part in the escalation of ethno–religious conflicts, particularly when adequate mechanisms to reduce their occurrence are not employed. The central issues continue to revolve around people, social equality, citizen’s rights and participatory democracy.

The negative effect of these conflicts is that, government, private individuals and groups have spent huge amount of money in rebuilding the destruction caused by ethno–religious conflicts in the country. The amount of money spent on Kaduna and Jos Plateau states alone would be enough to move Nigeria to another level of socio–economic and political development. What is

very much disturbing is the irreparable lives of Nigerians lost during such conflicts.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Ethnic and religious conflicts have seriously and negatively affected the socio-economic and political development of Nigeria as a nation. This has negative effects on the country's national security, stability and integration. The manipulation of religion and ethnicity has been a major obstacle to the country's efforts towards attaining greater height and as a force to be reckon with, the world over.

Ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria have become major boundaries that create divisions among people. Ethnicity and religion have also become potent tools for mobilization and manipulation in the country. They have been so manipulated that virtually all institutions in the public and private sectors have been polarized along ethnic and religious lines. Civil servants, community and social workers are most victims of intimidation and oppression in their places of work. Survival and job security are strongly based on who is of the same ethnic group and religion with the boss. These are ideologies that do not promote peaceful and harmonious co-existence among Nigerians. Our ethnic and religious values should have been a force that will encourage Nigerians to appreciate the great benefits derivable from working together as Nigerians in honesty and for a better future irrespective of our ethnic and religious differences.

1.3 Research Methodology

The research methodology adopted in this research work is the historical approach. Information was obtained from primary sources through oral interviews as they relate to the topic under discussion. Through the interviews conducted information was obtained from both Christians and Muslims groups. These include leaders and those faithful to Christianity and Islam, Government officials, Law Enforcement Agents, business men and women, teachers and students of tertiary institutions etc. these interviews were conducted from six randomly selected Local Government Councils in Kaduna State and from another six Local Government Councils in Plateau State. These include: Kaduna North and South Local Governments, Zangon Kataf Local Government, Jema'a Local Government, Zaria Local Government and Lere Local Government Council all in Kaduna State. While in Plateau State Jos North and South Local Governments, Wase Local Government, Lantang North Local Government, Panshin Local Government and Barkin Ladi Local Government Councils were used for the study.

Sampled survey assessment of perceptions or constructive views about ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna and Plateau States were made. The interview data proved to be crucial in making sense of how ethnic and religious identities are implicated in the ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna and Plateau States.

The researcher also obtained data from the secondary sources which include existing Text Books, Journals, Magazines, Newspapers, Periodicals and Handbills from Libraries and Archives. The Internet was equally a great source of information for the study. Presentation followed the analytical and descriptive approach.

1.4 Purpose of the study

This work is aimed at assessing the extent of human and material resources destroyed or lost in ethno-religious conflict in Northern Nigeria with particular reference to Kaduna and Plateau States. It also create awareness as to what Nigerian enemies, mostly in the Northern part of the country are doing underground to undermine the country's socio-economic and political growth and development.

The research unravels the roots and remote causes of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. And how these conflicts have dictated their ascendancy as normative process in the history of the country's march to socio-economic and political development as a nation state.

The work also aims at establishing the fact that each ethnic group is as important as the others. As such, the leadership of this great country is not the sole responsibility of only one particular ethnic group.

1.5 Significance of the study

The research reawakens in the minds of Nigerians the important role religion plays in the socio-economic and political development of Nigeria. That

is to say, that religion can be a very good tool for fostering national unity, economic and political development when properly handled. On the other hand, it can also be a disruptive instrument and viable tool for conflict if negatively handled.

Teachers, students and researchers of religion, economics, sociology and history in Nigerian schools will find the work benefiting to them as it furnishes them with current information on the country's social, economic, political and religious development. The research shall be useful to politicians and political leaders in decision making on issues that affects religion directly in the country.

It will help in the provision of relevant data on the genesis, effects and measures towards the control of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria particularly the Northern part of the country.

It will also unravel the awareness of decision makers on the effects of ethno-religious conflicts on the socio-economic and political development of Nigeria as a country. This will help in the formation of favourable policies and decisions that will stimulate a conducive atmosphere for the practice of religion in the country.

It will also serve as a means towards the development of a strategic action plan that will be a significant force in peaceful and harmonious co-existence amongst the practitioners of different religion in Nigeria.

It will strengthen a network of the all stakeholders who would share the experiences in the search for peaceful co-existence which will in no small measure contribute to the socio-economic and political development of Nigeria.

1.6 Scope of the Study

This research work focuses on the effect of ethno-Religious conflicts on the socio-economic and political development of Nigeria with particular reference to Kaduna and Plateau states. This is because, Kaduna and Plateau are ranked top among the list of States that have witnessed most perturbing and unprecedented upsurge of ethno-Religious conflicts in contemporary times in the country.

1.7 Definition of Terms

Religion: The word religion though lacks a universally acceptable definition is very relevant in man's life on earth. It is rooted in Latin words: *relegere* (to unite or link) and *religious* (relationship or bond). It therefore means a link or a relationship between man and a being that exists which is grater than man. Man and religion are inseparable in all human cultures (Achunike, 2007:1).

Elaigwu (2004:4) viewed religion as “a set of beliefs and practices based on faith, which are sacred and dept rational scrutiny”. Therefore, it can quite easily trigger off emotional reactions. Ekwunife in Achunike (2007:1) provides a walking definition when he state that religion is “man's awareness and recognition of his dependent relationship on a transcendent being – the wholly

other, expressible in human society through beliefs worships and ethical and moral behaviours”. However, for the purpose of this study, we shall adopt the definition by Merriam (1980:250) as our working definition who defined religion thus:

The outward act or form by which men indicate their recognition of the existence of God or gods having power over their destiny, to whom obedience, service, honour are due: the feeling or expression of human love, fear or awe of some super human and over-ruling power, whether by profession or belief, by observance or rites and ceremonies or by conduct of life.

Conflict: Sani (2007:43) defined Conflict as “a moment or time of danger or great difficulty, turning point, disaster, emergency, calamity or catastrophe, as level of Conflict with tense confrontation between mobilized armed forces”.

Economics: Hornby (2001:275) views economics as “the science of production, distribution and consumption of goods and services or the condition of a country as to materials prosperity”.

Development: Balogun (1988:178) defined development as “the act, process or result of developing, or state of being developed, gradual advancement or growth through progressive changes in Technological, scientific, political, social, economic and religious advancement leading to better condition of living”. Changes occur and can be seen or observed in all human endeavours.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Brief Analysis of Religious Conflicts

Conflicts arise from the pursuit of divergent goals and aspirations by individuals or groups. Changes in the socio-political and religious environments provide fertile ground for conflicts involving individuals and groups probably interested in suing such conflicts to achieve communal or non-communal goals. Thus every pluralistic society is bound to experience one form of conflict or the other (Makarfi: 2004)

Conflicts as defined by Sani (2007: 2) are viewed as thus: moments or times of danger or great difficulties. Turning points, disasters, emergencies, calamities, levels of conflicts with tense confrontations, between mobilized groups or armed forces ethno-religious conflicts are on the rise recently.

A review of available literature will be made so as to get at a clearer picture of the ethnic and religious Conflicts particularly in Kaduna and Plateau states. The review will begin with Kaduna State followed by Jos Plateau State under the following categories:

- (a) Religious conflicts in Kaduna State
- (b) Ethnic conflicts in Kaduna State
- (c) Political conflicts in Kaduna State
- (d) Land dispute conflicts in Kaduna State

This grouping is done so as to reconstruct properly the recorded series of conflicts as they occurred in the two states.

KADUNA STATE

2.1 Religious Conflicts in Kaduna State

Nache (2001:12) explained that, Jesus Christ is believed by all Christians to be the prince of peace. Christianity is therefore, totally believed to be a means for peace, prosperity, progress and development for all its adherents. Thus Christianity frowns at violence, injustice, and destruction of public property and the killing of innocent souls or lives. This position according to Nache is made clear in the gospel of Mathew where Jesus said that:

Blessed are the peace makers, for they shall be called children of God (Mathew 5:9). Jesus further says that and do not resist him that is wicked; but whoever slaps you on your right cheek, turn the other also to him (Mathew 5:39). In another portion of the same Mathew, Jesus said that; however, I say to you: continue to love your enemies and to pray for those persecuting you (Mathew 5:44).

From Christ teachings, Christians are obliged to be loving and peaceful to one another and non-Christians alike irrespective of their religious or cultural differences. Unfortunately, this understanding of Christ's teaching is gradually dying down. This is because modern Christian preachers, particularly of the Pentecostal generation demonize the other, particularly Islam and sometimes interpret the Bible wrongly. Supporting this point, Udoidem (1997:179–181) observed that:

The Pentecostal fundamentalists could be likened to the Islamic fundamentalists. They spread their message through public crusades and revivals often in a predominantly Muslims area. Therefore, Muslims resentment of them for violating their Shari a law which forbids Christians on their right to profess and practice their religion anywhere often results in confrontation.

Furthermore, the Christian fundamentalists and Pentecostals see Islam as a satanic kingdom and Muslims as Satan who ought not to be converted but condemned. Crusades that encapsulate this idea provoke negative reactions from Muslims. Udoidem (1979:180–181) further observed that:

This type of blatant insensitivity to others' religious sensitivity constitutes an act of provocation. It was this type of crusade that led to the Kano Riot in 1991 between Muslims and Christians... sometimes the Pentecostal and fundamentalist groups feel that the mainstream churches are too compromising in matters of faith and politics. Thus they often campaign to take over the leadership of CAN and use it as a political platform.

The researcher agrees with Achunike's (2007:11) View that:

Generally speaking, Muslim and Christian preachers are guilty of unwholesome preaching and negative comments against each other's religions, particularly in Northern Nigeria. In Eastern Nigeria, it is common knowledge that Christians engage in iconoclasm against the African Traditional Religion.

Islam as a religion is belief by all Muslims to be a religion of peace. To the best knowledge and belief of most Muslims, Islam has wonderful teachings on peace and peace building. This is clearly demonstrated in the Islamic teaching on religious tolerance which states that." And insult not those whom they worship besides Allah lest they insult Allah wrongfully without knowledge" (Qua'an 6:108). The above verse shows that, whoever wants others

to listen to him must equally learn how to listen to others. In other words, whoever wants people to respect his religion must respect other people's religion as well.

However, in the last three decades, from our experience, the peace that Islam and other religions enjoy is gradually declining due to the activities of some people. Some educated Muslims believe that some uneducated Islamic fundamentalists who know little or nothing about Islam as a religion are against it. The over-zealousness of Islamic fundamentalists has resulted in violent confrontation against non-Muslim, injustice, destruction of public property and the killing of innocent souls. The educated Muslims also believe that Islamic fundamentalists are of the belief that unbelievers of Islamic faith are infidels who are to be humiliated; and ultimately killed or converted as prescribed by the Holy Qur'an, (Qur'an 9:29).

The Qur'an however shuns excesses. Every religion at one time or another engaged in proselytization. Jihad is not a religious obligation binding on individual Muslim, but rather an obligation incumbent on the Islamic community as a whole, Jihad is a war undertaken for the spread of Islam. There are types of jihad outside of the sword (war). There is jihad of the heart where an individual attempts to be nearer God by purifying his soul of evil thoughts and desires. There is also jihad of the tongue by means of preaching, persuasion, the use of Islamic literature and so on to spread Islam. The

Ahmadiyah sect adopts today the jihad of the tongue. Nzomiwu in Achunike (2007:9) views jihad as holy war declared with the object of winning unbelievers (i.e. non-Muslims) over to Islam, or subduing and exterminating them in case they refuse to become Muslims. Furthermore, the Qur'an (2:190–193) urges Muslims thus:

Fight in the cause of God those who fight you. But do not transgress limits; for God loveth not transgressors. And slay them wherever you catch them. And turn them out from where they have turned you out; for tumult and oppression are worse than slaughter... fight them until there is no more tumult or oppression. And there prevail justice and faith in God.

The Qur'an (9:5) further commends thus:

When the sacred months are over, then fight, slay the pagans wherever you find them; And seize them, beleaguer them, and lie and wait for them in every stratagem (of war). But if they repent and establish regular prayers and practice regular charity, then open the way for them; for God is often-for-giving, most merciful". Any Muslim who dies in the course of such a war becomes a martyr.

Qur'an (3:169–170) attests that those who die in such wars are not actually dead but living in the presence of their Lord, their needs supplied, rejoicing in the bounty which God has given them. Nzomiwu in Achunike (2007:90) observes that:

Today many Muslim scholars and theologians agree that religion should be treated as a matter between man and his God, a matter of conscience in which nobody has right to interfere. They therefore advocate freedom of religion. Some even deny that the Qur'an ever enjoined on Muslims to fight jihad of the sword and maintain that the idea of the holy war for the spread of Islam and triumph of Islam over all religions was a wrong notion of jihad introduced by jurists owing to misconception of certain verses of the Qur'an.

Nevertheless, in many villages, towns and countries where Muslims are in the majority, there is always a tendency to regard non-Muslims as second-class citizens and this at times leads to oppression and denial of civic rights to non-Muslims

This is indeed a case with northern Nigeria where Muslims dominate. It is often the case where other religions are not encouraged to operate freely. The Sharia is a case in point where non-Muslims seem to be precluded in its jurisdiction.

Ubaka (2003:154) succinctly sums it as thus:

Sharia implies a totality of God's ordinances and prohibitions, which have to do with the activities of man. Its concern is all embracing, catering for all the activities of an individual from birth to death. Just as Islam, Sharia governs both the religion and secular life.

Following this, some injustices and unfair treatments are exhibited against non-Muslims.

The incessant ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria seem to be pulling her down like a gravitational force. The sad and ugly developments have been a source of great concern to many Nigerians and the international communities.

From a gradual and careful study of the records of religious conflict in Nigeria,

Sani (2007:43) stated that:

Nigeria has had various crises since independence particularly of note is the violent and regrettable thirty month civil war of the late sixties and early seventies. Nigeria has since then continued to have a resurgence of ethnic and religious conflicts that have scared the nation's socio-political landscape.

Ethno-religious conflicts have become "annual rituals" in some states in the northern part of Nigeria. Kano, Katsina, Bauchi, Plateau and Kaduna states

are particularly, Nigeria's hottest beds of religious upheavals. These states have assumed notoriety in harbouring violent ethno-religious effusions which constitute serious threat to lives and property (New Nigeria, December 16, 2001:3). In the last three decades, it is almost impossible to recall the number of ethno-religious conflicts that have occurred in the northern states at the slightest provocation since after the civil war in 1970, the first major conflict against the nation was the Maitatsine religious conflicts. These conflicts were tagged war against infidels. The conflict started in December 1980, about 4, 177 people were killed and property worth millions of naira were destroyed (News watch, March 30, 1987:6).

The ferocious ethno-religious conflicts coupled with the frequency of armed robbery incidents in Nigeria have dented the image and reputation of the country to the outside world. That is why the researcher agrees with the opinion of Duniya (1993:39) which stated that "Religious conflicts have become a recurring decimal in the nation making some important Nigerians to raise their voices against the ugly trend. This has created a chasm in the unity of the nation in general. Anugwom et al (2004: 143) further observed that:

Throughout recorded history in West Africa and indeed black Africa in general, Nigeria seems to rank top among the list of unprecedented upsurge of ethnic and religious disturbances in contemporary times. The situation has remained a constant threat to peace in Nigeria. The vigor it has assumed in contemporary Nigeria has therefore continued to threaten the nationalities that make up the country as a single sovereign democratic entity.

Some other researchers are of the view that the problem of ethno-religious conflict in Nigeria is a fundamental one. This is because it is intricately deep rooted in the culture of the people and permeates the Nigerian political system. On this note, Aligwekwe (2002:34) observed that “judging from the contents of Nigeria’s political problem which often exploded in ethno-religious conflict, it has a dose of cultural and factual coloration”. And because of these cultural and ethnic or tribal involvements, Angwom (2004: 143) asserted that “all efforts in the past to check or control these types of conflict through administrative and bureaucratic machineries have failed to yield practical or desired results”.

Furthermore, political scientists and sociologists have come to agree with the fact that most of the conflicts, whether ethnic, religious, political or social bedeviling the Nigerian nation and even its states and communities can be traced to the doorsteps of the colonialists who forcefully amalgamated ethnic groups into one entity called Nigeria. Writing on the inherent instability that has continued to create and sustain conflicts in the Nigerian socio-political system in his book *No Place to Hide: Crisis and Conflicts inside Biafra*, Bernard Odogwu Quoted by Sani (2007: 44) asserted that:

Nigeria was amalgamated by the colonial masters in 1914. Under normal circumstances the amalgamation ought to have brought the various people of the entity together and probable provide a firm basis for the odious task of establishing closer cultural, social, religious and linguistic ties among the people-ties which are vital

for true unity. Sadly, the colonial masters reasoned that if such a unity was allowed to develop, it would have announced to a major threat to the very economic interest they were striving to protect... as a result, there was division, hatred, strife, unhealthy rivalry, and pronounced disparity in development among the various people of the country.

The incursion of the military into the socio-political landscape also heighten ethno-religious tensions and conflicts in the country, particularly through the use and manipulation of religion as it happened on the issue of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) during the Babangida administration. In the opinion of Sani (2007: 45)

The Buhari-Idiagbon administration (1984 – 1985) took Nigeria to the OIC while Sani Abacha (1993 – 1998), ensured that Nigeria attended the OIC as a full member and went as far as consolidating the membership by introducing the non-profit Islamic banking system. The Abubakar Abdulsalami (1998–1999) regime adopted Babangida and Abacha's draft constitution on the Sharia appeal courts in the state in the 1999 constitution. The net effects of these manipulations saw Nigeria on both sides of the religious divide getting alienated and polarized against the very ethics which the military represents and, which is not ensuring national unity and integrity.

About the conflict of the two states under focus in this research which are Kaduna and Jos Plateau, they were established as the capital cities of the two states. Since their establishment, the two cities have attracted wide range of immigration from different parts of the country and beyond (Gandu, 2004:10). This makes them complex heterogeneous cities, thus provoking interpenetration across ethnic and religious lines.

Alisan (2000:8) reported that Kaduna state in particular since independence has grown to become one of the most important cities in northern Nigeria. Also, because of its political and strategic status, it became the military and police Headquarters of northern Nigeria, where the top brass of armed forces in the north resident. It has the highest concentration of military institutions in northern Nigeria.

Kaduna is now divided into two settlements: Christians dominate the southern part of the state while Muslims occupy the northern part of the state. People take undue advantage of this dominance in a particular section to foment ethno-religious conflicts. Kaduna which was relatively a peaceful town, has witnessed a circle of violence, which has singled it out as one of the most volatile cities in northern Nigeria (Makarfi, 2004:5).

Plateau state on the other hand, with its capital in Jos had attracted many people into settlement within it because of its calmed atmospheric condition and tourist's attraction. These conditions gave birth to commercial activities of different kinds in the State. This also led to the influx of people from different States, ethnic and religious backgrounds of the country into the city of Jos (Mohammed, 2005).

Against these backgrounds, there have been opposing relationships between the two dominant religions, Christianity and Islam, in the socio-economic and political affairs of the country. This further reveals that the

subsequent upheavals in the country often identified as ethno-religious conflicts from 1980 to date have political, social, ethnic and religious undertones. Other identified records of ethno-religious conflicts fact files where lives and property worth millions of naira were lost in some towns and villages of Kaduna and Plateau states include the followings:

The Ahmadu Bello University Zaria, Muslims and Christians student clashed in 1977-78 over ideological differences was the first ethno-religious conflict recorded in Kaduna state. Sani (2007) reported that the conflict came up when the Kegites club was celebrating the restoration of the Blackman's pride, and chose palm wine as one of the symbols of their rituals. As part of the rituals, members were expected to drink a lot of palm wine. However, the celebration did not go down well with the Muslim Students Society of the University, who claimed that the behaviour of the Kegites was the height of depravity, and since they as Muslims were prohibited from consuming alcohol, the Kegites had no right to flaunt this decadence in their face. They also argued that the glasses used by the Kegites were bound to be used by Muslim Students in the dining hall later. Thus, as soon as the Kegites party got underway, some members of the Muslim Students stormed the hall and organized a violent disruption of the Kegites' activities. Many Kegites were wounded in the process. The Muslim students went on further rampage, damaging other university buildings in the process.

The researcher observed that: the Muslim Students' reaction against the Kgites club members was uncalled for and considered very unfortunate. This is because the mere fact that glasses used by the Kegite Students and which might be used by Muslim Students in the dining hall was not enough to cause violence. After every usage of all the cutlery and glasses they are washed and kept clean for future use. Today, people can drink water from the same cup with HIV and Aids patients without being infected or even sleep on the same bed with them without being infected etc. These are areas where religious leaders and teachers need to educate their followers very well.

Hamza (1978) reported another deadly demonstration tag the 'I found it' (Jesus Salvation) religious demonstrations which took place simultaneously in Kaduna and Zaria towns in 1978. This resulted in the destruction of lives and property in both towns. Still in that same 1978, there was a demonstration by Muslims students from higher institutions in Kaduna and Kano states. The Muslim students embarked on an organized demonstration to press for the implementation of the world Islamic Congress Initiations which harped on the propagation or Islamisation of Nigeria or any tionother member country. Consequently, students from higher institutions in Kaduna and Kano states took to the streets calling for jihad against *Kaffir* and shouting slogans like "Islam only" "Constitution must go". These entire slogans were written on many walls

of both private and public buildings in the two states (*Newswatch*, May 30, 1978:17).

The demonstrators did not stop at that. They were alleged to have written their messages of protest on trees, parked vehicles and on vehicles belonging to Christians. It was in a bid to resist the attempt to write the slogan on a particular car allegedly belonging to a Christian that led to scuffles and free-for all-fights between Muslims and Christians. The causalities of the conflict could not be ascertained.

Yusuf (1980) reported an intra-religious conflict between Izala sect and Tijaniya sect in September 24, 1980 in Anchau, a town which is now the Local Government Headquarter of Anchau but formerly under Ikara Local Government Area of Kaduna State. This was alleged to have been sparked off by the verbal attack on the Tijanniya sect while the Izala group was preaching. In the ensuing violent conflict, many houses were set on fire. Two rifles and twenty-six rounds of ammunition were reportedly stolen during the conflict and the divisional police officer in Ikara and seven other policemen were injured and admitted in the hospital (*The Guardian*, September 26, 1980:3).

Kassiim (1982) reported the October, 1982, Maitatsine religious conflict in Rigasa, Kaduna state which virtually set Kaduna metropolis up in flames. N Maitatsine, whose real name was Muhammadu Marwa Maitatsine, was an itinerant or immigrant Islamic scholar who migrated from Cameroon to Nigeria

in the early eighties. Being expelled from Nigeria twice in seventeen years for disruptive behaviour, he managed to return to Kano where he finally settled. He, through his preaching, sought to purify the practice of Islam. He taught his followers, to resist laws which were not based on the tenets of the Holy Qur'an and also to resist constituted authority. He and his numerous followers denied and denounced materialism and ostentatious display of wealth. They also denounced the traditional Muslim custom of facing Mecca while praying. In no time, he had amassed large followers, who fanatically imbibed his ascetic teachings, which learned Ulama believed were against the historic teachings of Prophet Muhammad Salallahu Alai Wasalam (SAW). Apart from Kano, his numerous followers, numbering about 5000, migrated to Bulunkutu in Maiduguri and in areas like Anguwan, Muazu, Bakin Ruwa and Rigasa in Kaduna metropolis where they continued to learn under a mallam appointed by Maitatsine (*Times International*, March 10, 1984:10-11).

The Maitatsine sect had at times clashed with orthodox Muslims based on the interpretation of the Holy Qur'an. One of such clashes took place in Rigasa with mainly Muslim indigenous settlers. The conflict was over their mode of worship. The Maitatsine sect had insisted that the orthodox Muslims in the congregational prayer should not face Kaaba, which the orthodox Muslims resisted. The Maitatsine sect, therefore, launched an attack on the Muslims in Rigasa village in Kaduna state. In the process, about 200 people were killed.

An assistant commissioner of police in charge of Kaduna metropolis, Karimu Yakubu, was seriously injured by the bows and arrows thrown by the Maitatsine's followers who had mistakenly shot him. The senior police officer had visited the sect's enclave in Rigasa for an amicable resolution when he was shot. He died on October 29, 1982, eight days after he assumed office as the assistant commissioner of police in charge of Kaduna metropolis. The Maitatsine's sect leader in Kaduna, Umaru Mohammed, was also beheaded. Umaru was said to have hailed from Hamdala village in Borno state. He had escaped from Borno to Kaduna state (*Times International*, March 10, 1984:10-11).

Kafanchan College of Education was another scene of religious conflict in March 30, 1987. The conflict according to Ola (1987: 3-4, 25) started when an itinerant Christian preacher who was a recent convert from Islam, went to preach at a weekend gathering organized by the fellowship of Christian students (FCS) in the predominantly Christian town. In preparation of the programme, the Christian students printed a banner that read "Jesus Campus" at the gate of the college. That was used to direct invited guests to the venue of the meeting. But the Muslim students allegedly pulled this down under the excuse that Jesus does not own the campus in which they also dwelt. The Muslim students of the college had raised an alarm to their fellow Muslims over the inciting and allegedly blasphemous statement made by the preacher during the programme.

They accused the preacher, one Reverend Bello Abubakar Bako, of denigrating Islam and the Holy Qur'an. They went to confront their Christian colleagues and said that Reverend Abubakar deserved to be punished for this "heresy". On the strength of this offence, the Muslim students allegedly physically attacked Reverend Abubakar and their Christian colleagues in the process (*News Watch*, March 15, 1987:3-4, 25).

The conflict which was small at the beginning degenerated into violent religious conflict that spread into the town. Within few hours, churches and mosques in Kafanchan town were razed down. The week-long conflict soon turned into an orgy of bloody confrontation between Muslims and Christians, spreading to neighbouring towns like Kankia, Funtua, Kaduna metropolis, Zaria and environs. It was only the "shoot at sight" order of the then GOC, Peter Ademokhai that halted the murderous ethno-religious conflict thereby sparing the lives of many innocent Christians and Muslims. The escalation of the conflict was blamed on Radio Nigeria, Kaduna, which soon after the incident in Kafanchan, was alleged to have reported on an hourly interval that Christians in Kafanchan were killing Muslims while some other Muslims had fled into hiding and that two mosques had been burnt down and copies of Holy Qur'an were being burnt in public. The riot was said to be particularly serious in Zaria where over 40 churches, including that reported to be the oldest in northern Nigeria – St. Bartholomew's Angelical Church – were burnt. The family home

of Nigeria's former Head of State, Yakubu Gowon, adjoining a church, was vandalized and set on fire. Not satisfied with that the rioters attempted to exhume the remains of Gowon's late father (*Newswatch*, March 15, 1987:25).

The conflict equally spread over to Kankia and Makarfi towns. By the time the riot was brought under control, 25 people had died, 61 injured, over 6000 persons arrested and property valued at millions of naira had been damaged. Between 40 and 47 churches, 3 mosques, 46 private houses, 19 vehicles and 30 hotels were destroyed. Goods, shops, workshops, offices and petrol (fuel) stations were also destroyed (*The Guardian*, March 15, 1987:17).

There was also the Fun Times Magazine religious conflict of April 1993 in Kaduna. Sabiye (1993: 7) reported that the Fun Times, a general interest magazine published by Nigeria's Daily Times Groups, had carried a blasphemous article on Prophet Mohammad. This prompted some Shiite Muslims who had read the article to burn all the copies of the "offending magazine". Property worth hundreds of thousands of Naira was reportedly destroyed or burnt (*New Nigeria*, April 12, 1993:7).

Ibrahim (1994) reported an aborted religious conflict in Kaduna Metropolis in January 10, 1994. The conflict almost started when a Muslim man had attempted to burn down a Celestial Church of Christ building whose members were accused of cutting down a mango tree. The man a farmer accused some members of the Church of cutting down his mango tree

(economic asset) without his consent, and thus depriving him of some income. To retaliate, the man went to the church allegedly with a jerrycan of a substance suspected to be petrol, with which he planned to burn down the church and perhaps its members during the hour of worship. The sight of the man spraying the walls of the church with petrol caused panic and confusion, but some worshippers soon overpowered him, and handed him over to the police. If the Christians thought that this was the end of matter, they were wrong. Some Muslims, who had watched the “drama,” were said to have gone to the nearby abattoir to mobilize butchers for “action,” having convinced them that some Christians at the Celestial Church of Christ were about lynching the Muslim suspect (*New Nigeria*, January 12, 1994: 1-2).

About 40 butcher men, mostly teenagers, headed towards the church carrying knives, cutlasses and daggers. An ugly incident was averted only because the police had foreseen the eventuality and cordoned off the church building. Apparently frustrated, the butchers vented their anger by pelting stones at the police. The police, however, dispersed the group with the aid of tear gas and subsequently returned normalcy to the area (*New Nigeria*, January 12, 1994: 1-2).

Umezeh U (1996) reported that an Eclipse of the Moon resulted in another religious conflict in Kaduna Metropolis. According to Umezeh, the April 4, 1996, Eclipse of the Moon sparked off ethno-religious conflict in

Kaduna metropolis. It resulted in the destruction and looting of many churches, hotels and brothels by mob suspected to be Islamic fundamentalists. Apparently, some Islamic religious leaders had raised alarm and called out on other Muslims to go to the mosques for prayers on sighting the Eclipse of the Moon, the religious leaders attributed the Eclipse of “Allah’s displeasure” with the sins of the people. Muslims were, therefore, urged to pray seriously to avert Allah’s wrath (*Nigerian Tribune*, April 5, 1996:4)

The researcher wanders why a natural occurrence like the Eclipse of the Moon could cause conflict that resulted to loss of lives and property. Ordinarily, if the Muslims were convinced that such an occurrence was as a result of Allah’s displeasure with the peoples’ sins, their leaders should have convinced their followers to only remain calm in prayers. They should have not gone out to start looting, killing and destroying peoples’ property. The researcher therefore feels that religious leaders especially of the Islamic religion should seriously educate their followers on such types of natural incidents so as to avoid further ugly crises in future. Rather, some Muslims, fundamentalists, had a better idea than go to the mosque for prayers. Instead, they took to the streets chanting “Alahu akbar” (Allah is great), manhandling passers-by and attacking people in buildings, particularly hotels and brothels. They were later joined by almajiris and other hoodlums who took advantage of the situation to cause

mayhem. At the end of it all, at least twenty people were seriously injured and several private and public buildings were burnt down or seriously damaged.

Sadah (1996) reported on another religious which conflict rocked the Kaduna metropolis in 1996, when the Shiite sect took the streets, to protest the arrest of their leader, Ibrahim El-zakzaky. The Anti-riot policemen had to wade in to prevent breakdown of law and order. Their leader, Ibrahim El-zakazaky, was arrested and detained by the Federal Government for allegedly distributing offensive leaflets that had earlier caused an ethno-religious conflict in the state(*New Nigeria*, April 5, 1996:9).

Umar and Andrew (1996) reported on another deadly religious conflict which erupted in Kaduna when the authorities of the Federal Polytechnic, Kaduna, and now City University Kaduna rusticated some students in mid 1996 for alleged involvement in examination malpractices, they hardly bargained for what would follow. Among the rusticated students, four or five were also members of the Islamic movement usually referred to as Shiite. But the Shiite viewed the inclusion of the Shiite students among those rusticated as an act of victimization of their sect. They, therefore, demanded that the suspended Shiite students be recalled and threaten a showdown with the polytechnic authorities if they do otherwise. Their threat was, however, ignored.

Subsequently, on the morning of June 13, 1996 to be specific, the members of Kaduna Polytechnic Community were jolted by the call to arms by

the Shiite. That was when it became crystal clear that the Shiite students meant to carry out their earlier threat of showdown with the polytechnic authorities. Fleeing students soon discovered that all but one of the six gates leading in and out of the polytechnic had been cordoned off by the Shiite students who had recruited fellow fundamentalists from outside the campus to join the imminent sack students of the Federal polytechnic, Kaduna.

The authority, in a bid to check the riot, which ensued, called in law enforcement agents. But matters only deteriorated and the polytechnic was temporarily closed down for two weeks, but not before the police, arrested and detained some Shiites who were alleged to have been involved in the brawl. On Monday June 19, 1996 the suspects were charged before the chief Magistrate Court at Taiwo road, Kaduna, but the court session was disrupted by over 2000 Shiites from the Tudun-wada part of the town.

The protesters brandishing dangerous weapons forcefully freed the students suspects whom they claimed did not deserve to be charged before a court. They then marched in a procession to the closed Kaduna polytechnic where they attempted to forcefully enter the campus at Tudun-wada to “deal” with the polytechnic authorities. But a team of about 200 anti-riot policemen from the Kaduna state Police Command arrived at the scene and prevented the protesters from gaining access to the campus.

From that point, a free-for-all fight ensued and before it was brought under control, 10 persons were alleged to have died. Among them was an inspector of police who was said to have been pinned down and slaughtered like a ram. Two other junior officers were lynched and at least seven civilians and several others sustained different degrees of injury. The service pistol of the inspector and eight rounds of ammunition were allegedly snatched by the fanatics (*The News*, June 30, 1996: 19-20).

Frances (1996) reported another ethno-religious conflict on September 6, 1996 in Kafanchan, Jemma Local Government Area of Kaduna state. The conflict began at about 1:30pm on Friday September 6, 1996 when a number of Muslims gathered in a mosque for the usual Friday devotion. Reports had it that as they were settling down for the prayer session, the voice of a Christian Preacher, Monday Yakonat, intruded. Reverend Yakonat was preaching in the open space close to the mosque. The Muslims thought that the preacher had brought “his gospel” too close to the mosque at a time he knew Muslims would be praying. This was regarded as blasphemy (*The Guardian*, September 8, 1996:17-18).

Thus, at the prompting of one Dan Dauda, Muslim youths abandoned their prayers and made for the preacher. Revered Yakonat was abducted and detained in Dan Dauda’s house. The Police Authorities, in Kafanchan, initially showed reluctance if not outright refusal to intervene. Believing that the police

may not intervene or act faster towards quelling the situation, the Christian youths mobilized support, and stormed the house of Dan Dauda. Fierce fighting ensued, the Muslim group, which was fewer in number, was overwhelmed and the Christian preacher was set free.

Consequently, the move by the Christians was said to have further rattled the Muslims who regrouped, and went after the Christians with the aim of re-arresting the preacher. The attack and counter-attack lasted for two days before security operatives moved in. By the time normalcy was restored, at least five people were feared dead. Several others were seriously wounded and property estimated at millions of Naira had been destroyed (*The Guardian*, September 8, 1996:17-18).

The reluctant attitude of the police in the Kafanchan religious conflict was one out of many incidents where many lives and property have been lost due to police poor response to crises in the country. This cold attitude of the police during crises, make people suspect them of foul play. That is to say, Muslim police during crises always support their Muslim brothers while Christian's police during crises always support their Christian brothers. In such situations there is no how the police will act promptly in times of crises for the restoration of peace and normalcy in the country.

Furthermore, Maigari (1996) reported that following allegations that immediately after the arrest and detention of the Christian preacher, the group

responsible had sent signal to their leader, Ibrahim El-zakzaky, in Zaria, for direction on how to handle the “offender”. A special police unit from the Federal Capital, Abuja, swooped on the Zaria residence of El-zakzaky on September 12, 1996 and arrested him and a handful of his followers. This sparked off protest by Shiite faithful in Kaduna, Kano, Zaria, Kastina, Funtua and Sokoto on September 13, 1996. No fewer than six and possible 14 Shiites died while several others were injured during the violent clash between the sect members and the police. This did not deter the Shiites, rather on Monday September 16, 1996 they threatened government with the ultimatum published simultaneously in Zaria and Kaduna, which says “produce and set our leader free before Friday September 20, 1996 or face further protest” (*The News*, September 30, 1996:16).

In spite of the early warning and police preparedness, the police were caught unawares in an apparent move that was as deft as it was calculated. The fundamentalists’ unleashed terror on Kaduna metropolis on Wednesday, September 18, 1996 two days before their deadline. Thousands of Shiites took part in the riot. The rioters ransacked a police station at the Kaduna Central market and took away guns and communication gadgets. When the police called for reinforcement, the Shiites ran into the market to mingle with genuine sellers and buyers, thus making it difficult for the police to identify them. But the fighting continued through Wednesday, with media reports putting the death

toll from 20 – 50, including security operatives (*The News*, September 30, 1996:20).

Gilbert (200) reported that Kaduna metropolis was plunged into another mindless religious Conflict over the debate of the introduction and implementation of the Sharia legal system between February 21 and 24, 2000. An attempt to introduce the Sharia law in Kaduna state led to the Conflict. Tension escalated when the all-Muslim committee set up by the State House of Assembly submitted its report. The 15-Man Committee said it received 133 oral presentations out of which only 13 were against the introduction of Sharia in the State. It also collected 267 written memoranda all but seven of which they alleged were against the implementation of the law. The committee said that Sharia law is divine and obligatory on all Muslims and forms part of section 38 of the 1995 constitution, which gives freedom of thought, conscience and religion. They equally cited the inadequacy of the existing penal code in meeting the day-to-day dealing of Muslims. It, however, cautioned that Sharia should be restricted to Muslims only (*The News*, February 28, 2000:5-8).

The conflict was sparked off somewhere in the Leventist Round about of Kaduna metropolis when a group of Muslim youths in support of the Sharia legal system in the State attacked the Christian protesters against the Sharia legal system.

This was an action the researcher considered as a violation of human right. This is because the Christians had the right to organize a peaceful demonstration against the introduction of Sharia which was not going to be to their favour. The population of Kaduna based on the researcher's personal observation is made up of 60% Christians and 40% Muslims. So how was the establishment of the Sharia law going to be possible in Kaduna?

Right from the early hours of Monday February 21, 2000, when the violence broke out, hundreds of people were allegedly killed within the first two days. The violence, like bush fire, soon spread to other places; Kafanchan became a refugee town with over 40,000 displaced persons. The violence also erupted in Zaria when ABU medical students' hall near Tudun-wada Zaria was attacked and the female students were manhandled by the rampaging demonstrators (*The News*, February 28, 2000:5-8)

Lukeman (2000) reported that following the unprecedented number of southerners massacred in the Kaduna religious violence, reprisal attacks were launched in Lagos, Aba and Umuahia against the northerners in these places. Hundreds of people were killed and property worth millions of naira lost in the process. Based on police report, 700 people were said to have lost their lives in this conflict, while hundreds of people were equally injured. Over 1'950 buildings, 746 vehicles, 55 mosques and 123 churches were razed. It was an ethno-religious conflict where sophisticated weapons like military rocket

launchers, bombs, grenades and locally made pistols were freely used (*News watch*, March 20, 2000:25).

Ndagi (2000) also, reported that after March 2000 conflict, there was yet a second phase of the Sharia religious conflicts which broke out on May 18, 2000, in Kaduna on account of the disagreement over the Islamic legal system. The second mayhem was widely believed to have been sparked off by the alleged murder of an unidentified person said to be a Christian in Narayi village Kaduna on the morning of Monday May 22, 2000. The skirmish was to snowball into a full-scale war the following day as reprisal attacks were carried out around Bamawa, Narrayi and environs. Although the conflicts were brief, the damage cost was far-reaching and unquantifiable. About 500 people were said to have been killed in these conflicts. The Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) and Jamatul Nasir Islam (JNI) conducted a house to house count in the areas most affected. They arrived at 721 lives lost for Muslims and 1'034 for Christians. Another independent research by an NGO arrived at 5000 lives lost during the conflict (*News watch*, July 3, 2000:16).

Otuwoyo (2001) reported another religious conflict which took place in October 2001. The conflict resulted to the burning down of some churches at Hayin Banki in Kaduna metropolis. On the day of the conflict, two churches at different locations were allegedly burnt down in a Muslim-dominated area. The Kaduna state government however claimed that the fire was either as a result of

an electrical fault but that armed robbers or thieves set them ablaze. The Network of Pastors, however, faulted government's explanation on the following grounds: that it was most improbable that on one particular night, only churches which were at different locations would be singled out for an electrical fault that would destroy and set them ablaze; the Muslims were alleged to have done that. At the period of this attack, it was alleged that Muslims attempted to set ablaze Rhema living Word Church at Kabala Costain, using petrol that they siphoned out of a generator. They allegedly set ablaze the wood near the generator. The flame attracted neighbours who rushed out to put off the fire (The News, November 5, 2001:22).

Sani (2007: 110-111), reported another religious conflict in Kaduna over a *Thisday* blasphemous newspaper article on Prophet Muhammad and a protest against the Miss World pageant in Nigeria between November 21 and 24, 2002. On Wednesday, November 29, 2002, Muslim adherents caused great commotion in Kaduna over the *Thisday* Newspaper story which they described as satanic and blasphemous. The offending article titled, "The World at their Feet", was written by Isioma Daniel. The Muslims said paragraph five of the first page of Daniel's write-up was an insult. The offending commentary which was likened to Salman Rushdie's satanic verses according to Sani (2007:110) reads:

As the idea became a reality, it also aroused dissent from many group of people. The Muslims thought it was immoral to bring 92 women to Nigeria and ask them to revel in vanity. What would Mohammed think? In all honesty, he would probably have chosen a wife from one of them. The irony is that Algeria, an Islamic country is one of the countries participating in the contest.

To the researcher, the above interpretation may be correct, but the subsequent conflicts it generated were uncalled for. The Conflict started as a result of the quick reaction of the Movement for Islamic Culture and Awareness (MICA). The group reacted quickly and said to suggest that Prophet Muhammad would pick a bride from among women such as Miss World contestants was grossly insulting to his personality and the sensibilities of the Muslim population.

Thus, seething with rage, thousands of Muslim youths armed with machetes, daggers, and clubs took to the streets chanting “Allah Akbar” (Allah is great). They made straight for the object of their fury. *Thisday* and all it stood for. On Jos road, they visited all newspapers and magazines distributions centres, confiscated *Thisday* publications and burnt them. The next port of call was the paper’s sales office on Ahmadu Bello Way where they made a bonfire of all the publication’s unsold copies (Sani, 2007).

The rioters, apparently, had a target as they moved to the *Thisday* regional office at Attahiru Road, Malali, and GRA Kaduna. When they got there, they set the whole building ablaze. The efforts of the paper’s regional

editor, Josephine Lohor, to stop the torching failed as the building was already on fire before the arrival of the police. Even at that, the fire-fighters who arrived at the scene could not do much as they complained of lack of water. The protesting youths also passed a Fatwa (death sentence) on the publisher of *Thisday*, Nduka Obaigbena.

By Thursday, the conflict took a new dimension as the protesters shifted their attention from the *Thisday* office to every other object they felt constituted a threat to their religion. A number of vehicles, 16 churches, 11 hotels, 189 houses and 3 schools were burnt. Before the conflict was brought under control, about 220 people were killed, 1'500 wounded and over 30'000 displaced (Sani, 2007).

2.2 Ethnic conflicts in Kaduna State

Sani (2007:99), reported on the June 1984, ethno-communal conflict of Gure and Kahugu communities, in Lere Local Government Area of Kaduna state. The Gure and Kahugu are two neighbouring communities situated in the western part of Lere Local Government Area of Kaduna state. The two communities shared some historical antecedents in several respects. History has it that they both migrated from the hilltop around the area and eventually settled at their present locations. The conflict began as a minor squabble in a drinking house soon spread like wild fire and engulfed the entire community. The causality figure recorded was eight dead bodies, one missing and more than 50

injured. In addition, a lot of properties were burnt while several farmlands were destroyed. The state government constituted A.D Yahaya's Commission of inquiry to look into the remote and immediate causes of the disturbance and make appropriate recommendations to the government.

Jega (1992), reported another violent ethno-communal conflict between the Hausa-Fulani settlers and Kataf indigenes in Kaduna state over the location of a market in Zangon Kataf. The chairman of the old Zangon Karaf Local Government Council, Juri Babang Ayok, proclaimed on January 30, 1992 that the Zango weekly market should be moved to a new site along Magamiya road on February 6, 1992 (*Citizen*, June 15, 1992:11)

On the day Babang Ayok, the Local Government Chairman issued his relocation order; the new site was being leveled with bulldozers. It was alleged that Ayok did not obtained an approval from the local council before he issued the proclamation. Besides, the new market site at Magamiya road is within 5km radius from the town centre and was designated at urban land under the Kaduna state (Designated land in Urban Areas) order of 1990. As such, only the state government had jurisdiction over the land. The Old Zango market had existed from time immemorial. Most of the stalls were owned by Hausa traders and there was little space left for the emerging Kartaf traders to trade in (*Citizen*, June 15, 1992:12)

Consequently, the Hausa traders in Zango resented the council's action and saw in it as a political vendetta, especially since the official reason for the relocation was the shortage of stalls in the old market. The Hausa-Fulani protest led by one Danbala, urged the traders not to move to the new site. On February 5, 1992 Danbala obtained an injunction from the upper area court in Kafanchan restraining the Local Council from relocating the market the next day. The injunction was served to both Council Chairman and the Police by Danbala himself on February 6, 1992. The Police Division Officer at Zonkwa, Damian Audu, ignored the order on the ground that it was irregular, and instead, he ordered his men in Zango to ensure that the new market site was protected. Audu had previously sent a signal to Police Headquarters in Kaduna warning that the market relocation could lead to violence. The policemen already guarding the new market were confused. The Cudjoe Panel heard about the conflict between their order and the injunction Danbala was brandishing. The situation soon got out of hand and conflagration ensued. The Police in Zango joined by a detachment from Zonkwa were totally unable to contain the carnage (*Citizen*, June 15, 1992:12)

The Cudjoe judicial commission of inquiry into the Zangon Kataf (market) conflict was appointed by the then governor of Kaduna state, Dabo Mohammed Lere, on February 11, 1992, five days after the conflict. It was made up of seven members, namely, Rahila Hadea Cudjoe, a judge of the

Kaduna High Court as Chairperson, and Massound Oredola, William Fagei Shera, Jaafaru Makarfi, Garba Galadima, Abbas Usman and Musa Gaya as members. The secretary was Bashir J. Sukola of the Ministry of Justice, Kaduna state (*Citizen*, June 15, 1992:14)

The terms of reference of the commission of inquiry included the following: to inquire into, investigate and identify the immediate and remote causes of the conflict, assessed the extent of damage; ascertain and identify the roles played by individuals and groups in causing tension and outbreak of violence; determine the extent of loss of lives and property; examine any other matter incidental to the items above; and to recommend appropriate action to be taken against those found responsible and recommend measures to forestall future occurrence (*Citizen*, June 15, 1992:15-16)

Evidence before the Cudjoe panel confirmed the death of 95 people, most of whom were Hausa-Fulani. Police source put the death toll at 200-300 while NGOs and human rights groups put the figure at above 1000. The number of injured persons was put at 252, not counting those who did not go to any hospital. Also for property damaged, government experts commissioned by the panel confirmed that 28 motor vehicles and plants worth N4.2 million were completely burnt, all of them in Hausa areas. In addition, 10 motor vehicles worth N412, 000 were damaged, 9 motorcycles worth N121, 000 were burnt and other things such as spare parts, generating sets, bicycles and sewing

machines worth N4.2 million were destroyed. Also destroyed were 133 houses worth N7.3 million and 26 farmlands worth N821, 000 (*Citizen*, June 15, 1992).

Dominic (1999) reported another violent ethnic demonstration by the indigenous community in Kafanchan over the imposition of a Muslim Emir on them. The indigenous community who are predominantly Christians saw that as an attempt to continue to impose Hausa-Fulani emirs on them. They therefore reacted violently to prevent the presentation of staff of office to the new emir, Isa Mohammed. On Saturday May 22, 1999, Youths from Kaninkon and Fantsuwam allegedly barricaded the route of the then military administrator, Umar Ahmed Farouk, who had an appointment in Kafanchan that day. The demonstrators, it was alleged, never intended to be violent until they were attacked by the Muslim community. The conflict was allegedly sparked off when a Kaninkon man was killed. By the time the then military administrator realized that there was a roadblock ahead, the town had exploded into violence. It was the prompt intervention of security agents that brought the chaotic situation under control. More than 30 people were said to have died and all the belongings of the Emir of Jemma were burnt in the riot (*Tell*, June 7, 1999:32)

Dantani (2001) reported the Sanga-Gwantu 2001, ethno-religious conflict in Kaduna state. Sanga Local Government Area is situated between Nassarawa and Plateau States, and it was the scene of communal and religious conflict in 2001. There were different angles to the conflict. A section of the community

said the conflict was due to the location of the proposed local government secretariat (*The News*, August 27, 2001:5-7)

Another angle to the conflict according to Dantani was over the the proposed location of a Sharia or customary court in Gwantu. Though, it seems that the location of the court only served as the immediate cause of the conflict to settle deep-rooted resentment. There were allegations also that the conflict was caused by the indiscipline of the village head and bias of the State government in dealing with several reported cases of threat to peace in the area by the village head. The suspended Chairman of the Local Government, Frank Bala Baba, said that the Chief had since September 1999, incited people against the local government administration, yet he was not disciplined by the appropriate authority (*The News*, August 27:5-7). This was preceded by the Bajju-Ikulu communal Conflict in April 7, 2001, over the changed nomenclature of the town from Kamuru Station to Kamuru Ikulu. The conflict resulted in lost of many souls and property of millions of naira.

2.3 Political conflicts in Kaduna State

Abdullahi (2001) reported the June 30, 2001, Yarkasuwa political disturbance over the installation of a new District Head of Kurama Chiefdom which was given religious connotation. The conflict resulted in lost of many souls and property worth millions of naira (*Newswatch*, July 10, 2001:3).

Usman (2002:14) reported the September to October, 2002, Federal College of Education, Zaria, Students Unionism conflict. The conflict broke out as a result of students' union elections. During the students' union election, it was alleged that Muslim students drafted other Muslims from Tudun-wada and Gyellesu into the campus. These mobs then invaded the female hostel, raping, causing deep injuries and killing some of the students as well. The total number of dead was not actually known, but it was alleged to have been between 4 and 25 people (*New Nigeria*, October 25, 2002:14).

The National Mirror of (April 19, 2011) reported another political conflict that came up on April 18, 2011 in Kaduna State. The State came under serious attack with the burning of Vice President Namadi Sambo's resident in Zaria. Churches and Mosques in Zaria were also burnt down during the crises. The protests are reportedly being spearheaded by the supporters of the defeated presidential candidate of the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), Major General Muhammadu Buhari.

The conflict leads to the death of many people, while many other people escaped death with varying degrees of injuries during the incident. The Emir of Zazzau was not spared as his official residence was razed by the protesters. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) office was burnt down. The protesters also forced open the Zaria Central Prison, letting off the inmates. The crises spread to other areas and towns in Kaduna like Tirkania, Maraban Rido, Sabon Tasha, Narayi, Ungwan Sarki and Kawo which were also badly

affected by the crises. Other towns in Kaduna which include Zonkwa, Kagoro and Kafanchan also a terrible share of the crises where many more people were killed and property worth millions of naira were destroyed (*National Mirror*, April 19, 2011:2-3,53).

Aliyu and Lawal (2011) further reported that most of the areas affected by protests in Zaria include Zaria city, Tudun Wada, Samaru, Dan Magaji and Gwarwaji. Almost all the PDP Chieftains official and private residences were burnt down (*National Life*, April 19, 2011:4-7).

To avert further escalation of the conflicts, the Federal Government in conjunction with the affected Northern States Governors immediately imposed a 24 hour curfew on the states metropolis and their environs, and directed all Security Agencies to immediately enforce the order.

Commenting on the April 18, 2011, political conflicts in some states of the North, Soyinka (April 29, 2011:1-2, 48) expressed fears over the continued existence of Nigeria as one Nation. His fears were based on the carnage and destruction of property in many states in the North in the wake of the declaration of President Goodluck Jonathan as the winner of the April 16, 2011, presidential election. Soyinka, who affirmed that President Goodluck Jonathan duly won the election, said the violence in the North was planned and meant to destabilize the country. According to Soyinka:

In my view, these killings were planned well before hand. Anybody who says contrary must be a naïve individual. I'm convinced and I say with all sense of responsibility that the killings

and mayhem have been planned before hand. These killings are unnecessary waste of human lives. They are therefore not acceptable.

Soyinka therefore, charged the President to tackle the problem facing the country head on; in a comprehensive and holistic manner, not in piecemeal; and not scratching here and there. Otherwise there is great fear for the continuum of this nation. Soyinka believed that some prominent Nigerians were behind the crises. He said that as he watched the body language of some of those leaders, he did not detect any vestige of remorse or genuiness. There was a complete disjunction between what the mouth was saying and the body language. He suggested that, “the culture of impunity must stop and that it is about time we sat down and adopt the code of common behaviour with distinct punishment for those who violated that code of mutual existence” (*National Mirror*, April 29, 2011:48).

Abdullahi (2011) reported that the post election crisis that led to the wanton destruction of lives and property in Katanchan town was carried out between the hours of 9pm on 18 April, 2011 to 12 noon on 19 of April 2011, when a team of soldiers arrived. The carnage according to Abdullahi, was perpetrated within 30 hours before the arrival of the military. Abdullahi stated that they received distressed calls on Monday, April 18, from Muslim communities in Zonkwa Zangon Kataf Local Government, that they were surrounded by Christian’s militants, who were bent on killing them. Shortly after that the killing started.

Therefore, while the killings were going on according to Abdullahi in Zonkwa, allegedly by arm Christian's youths, other Muslim settlements in Southern Kaduna were not spared. The massacre, according to Abdullahi left hundreds of Muslims dead and their property destroyed. This was replicated in Samaru, Kagoro, Madakiya, Matsirga, Madakiya, Matsirga, Ungwar Rimi, Gidan Maga, Tsarkiya, Sabon Garin Kwoi, among others. All the Muslim Communities were wiped out with very few who fled taking refuge in Kaduna and Keffi.

Abdullahi (2011) further asserted that:

Unknown to them Kafanchan town which is the largest Muslim Settlement in Southern Kaduna, was already under Siege. All roads leading to or from the town were blocked by Christian Militants. The first known victim of kafanchan crisis was a Muslim Commercial driver name Nasiru Jere, who was forcefully stopped, killed and his body burnt along side his vehicle at Gidan Bature, along Ungwar Rimi Kafanchan road that faithful Monday. All this was reported to the police in Kafanchan. Abdullahi explained.

However, Kure (2011) of the Throne Room Trust Ministry in Kafanchan faulted Abdullani's explanation on the post election crisis in Kafanchan. On this note therefore, Kure explained that:

First of all, it is clear that the whole crisis was thoroughly pre-planned with logistics set out and lines of action and operation spelt out clearly. Otherwise, one can not explain what a spontaneous call for prayer on most of the loudspeakers in the Mosques across the city at the same time at 9pm or thereabout with a shout of Allahu Akbar was all about. Muslims began to troop toward, the mosques and designated areas to be followed at 10pm with another call on loudspeakers. This was repeated a few times and the killings and burnings began.

Kure (2011) was with the belief that the whole thing was pre-planned. This is because, the fighters on that night wore black dresses or dark pants like a coloured uniform and surrounded the walls of the Anglican Cathedral and the Yoruba Baptist pastor's house and setting them on fire while shooting without any resistance continued. It was premeditated and planned. That can not be referred to as "peaceful demonstration and gathering.

According to Kure (2011), in the history of this great nation, he is not aware of any demonstration at night by 9 to 10 pm except they were clandestine. This is because during their operation, they seemed to have reinforcement centres where they went to for either arms/armunation or some form of coordination. Some reports even mentioned some coordination and movement from the Emir's Palace. This led to some of these locations being attacked after the attackers became short of arms and could not sustain the movement anymore.

Kure (2011) further opines that the kind of heavy guns and weapons used have never been heard of in the history of unrest in Kaduna state. This was why they overran almost the whole city before the youths, by the next day, could muster courage to push them back. Danhaya Street is a summary of what happened. It is the Berling Wall from which the Muslims attacked the Christians before the Christians gain composure. No Christian building is standing there except by a strange miracle.

The April 19-20 post election crisis had the greatest toll on the socio-economic life of Kafanchan town than ever before. The Kafanchan central market and central motor park – the biggest market and garage in the entire Southern Kaduna were reduced to ashes during the pogrom. All schools remained closed, disrupting the educational activities and the general school calendar for the period as a result of the crises. The situation impacted negatively on the already poor standard of education in the northern part of the country. Kafanchan became a ghost town different from its former self with burn residential houses, business premises and places of worship dotting every part of the town.

Kure (2011) again, reported that the peace achieved after the post election violence that claimed the lives of hundreds of people and property worth billions of naira in some parts of the north was still been threatened. This is because a week after the crisis, an audio record of one Islamic cleric in Zaria laden with hate messages and a call to arm against non Muslims and some Chieftains of the people Democratic party (PDP), who are resident in Kaduna was discovered being circulated. The recorded audio contained the Islamic cleric claimed that he and his comrades were determined to avenge the injustices done them in the elections. He also claimed that the crisis in Kafanchan and the return of Patrick Yakowa as the state governor were injustices against Muslims.

The circulation of the CD message left many people feeling unsafe, especially as the last crisis took the security operatives more than three days to quell. Already, some prominent indigenes of the state have spoken against the danger of allowing another blood letting.

Kure (2011) a prominent pastor and founder of the Throne Room Trust Ministry, who listened to the tape observed that religious violence was capable of destabilizing not only the north, but the entire country. As one who witnessed the April 19-20 post election violence in Kafanchan, Kure said he was disturbed after listening to the tape. The tape was produced in Zaria between April 29, and 30, 2011, with the intention of mobilizing Islamic fundamentalists to unleash another round of violence on the state. Kure therefore advised the security agencies not to dismiss its content as empty threat because the producers of the tape were determined to actualize every thing they said in it. The tape was specific on individuals and groups whose lives were at stake. Even students of some higher institutions were also mentioned as targets. The group also pronounced fatawa (a sanction for killing) on some prominent politicians in Kaduna State.

Kure (2011) further revealed that apart from the April 19 and 20 Kaduna mayhem, he has survived so many of such violence which claimed the lives of some members of his close family. He remarked that, “having experienced this latest violence in kafanchan, my fear is another plan was being hatched to desterbise the state should not be dismissed as crying wolf”. He also said that

the failure of the Congress for Progressive Change, CPC to win the presidential election was just answered prayers for some Muslims fundamentalists who were anxiously waiting for any opportunity to settle old scores.

Kure (2011) briefly explained that Christians and Muslims in Kafanchan have had a long history of Adversarial relationship over the leadership of Jema'a Emirate. The problem started during the colonial era when the Emir of Jema'a was banished from Gidan Waya to Madakya and then to kafanchan for an undisclosed sin he committed against the colonial authorities. Kafanchan, where he was banished to, was not part of the conquered territory of the Hausa/Fulani Jihadists. However, after independence in 1960, the Sardanuna of Sokoto restored the banished Emir to his position but failed to return him to Gidan Waya where he belonged, thereby making him king over other Chiefs and tribes in a place where he was supposed to serve his punishment. So, the question of who controls Kafanchan politically and who is minority or majority ethnic group has now become the fallout of that decision.

Therefore, Kure (2011) just like other people is of the belief that the problem is not the type that has defied logical solution as long as both sides would agree to tell the truth. A meeting of stakeholders should be constituted to address the situation in order to find a solution to the problem of incessant conflicts in the state.

2.4 Land dispute conflicts in kaduna State

Zakkari (1980) reported on the 1980, inter-ethnic communal land dispute which erupted between the Hausa and Kadara in Kasuwan Magani, Kajuru Local Government Area of Kaduna state. The conflict resulted in the lost of many souls and property worth millions of naira (*New Nigeria*, November 22, 1980:13)

PLATEAU STATE

Plateau State on the other hand seems to be taking the lead from Kaduna State, among the list of the states that have witnessed most deadly and unprecedented upsurge of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria today. The State especially, has a lot of features, which attracted a large population and support various economic activities (Mohammed, 2005:42). It is the discovery of tin and columbite on the Plateau by the British that led to the conscription of labourers from all the provinces of Northern Nigeria to work in the tin mines. The high fertility of the land equally attracted farmers from distant places to engage in the production of various crops. The climatic situation of the Plateau, which is near temperate along with the abundant water and pasture led to the flocking of livestock rearers to the area. The absence of diseases which are detrimental to the rearing of flocks led to a heavy concentration of livestock usually reared by the Fulani on the Plateau. The temperate climate of the Jos Plateau coupled with its natural tourist's resources attracted Nigerians and foreigners alike to the Plateau for vacation, permanent settlement or retirement. The location of Jos as a transport node served by an airport and rail link, to the

north and south of the country as well as road transport network to different parts of the country facilitates commerce (Mohammed, 2005: 43).

Human Rights Watch 2001 reported that, Plateau State, including its capital Jos, is inhabited by both Christians and Muslims. While Christians are in the majority, the Muslims constitute a significant minority. It is home to several ethnic groups, which fall into two broad categories: those who consider themselves “indigenes” or original inhabitants of the area-among them the Birom, the Afizere and the Anaguta and those who are termed “non-indigenes” or “settlers”, composed in large part of Hausa (the majority ethnic group in Northern Nigeria), but also of southern Igbo, Yoruba and other ethnic groups. Some of the “settlers”, notably the Hausa, have been living in the area for several generations. Neither the “indigenes” nor the “settlers” are monolithic in religious terms, but Christianity tends to be the dominant religion among the indigenes, while Islam is the dominant religion among the settlers (*HRW*, 2001).

However, in the past few years, the deepening ethno-religious and political conflicts witnessed in the state have eroded a greater part of those fortunes that Plateau State had enjoyed for a long time. In the light of these therefore, we shall also, discuss some recorded conflicts in the State in the last three decades (1980-2011) under the same categories with Kaduna State which include:

- (a) Religious conflicts in Plateau State
- (b) Ethnic conflicts in Plateau State
- (c) Political conflicts in Plateau State
- (d) Land dispute conflicts in Plateau State

2.5 Religious conflicts in Plateau state

In September 3, 1980, Members of the young Muslims Association of Nigeria, an offshoot of the Yashau Idris-led Darika Islamic sect, attacked a police patrol team with bows, arrows, machetes, knives, iron rods, etc, killing two policemen and seriously injuring one of them in the process. The clash was instigated by the invitation extended to the police to intervene in the imminent clash between the Darika and the Tijanniya Muslim Sects. The Tijanniya Muslim sect had on several occasions warned the Yashau Idris group, who periodically engaged in provocative and blasphemous preaching about their impression that other Muslims preaching was diabolical, misleading and not designed to instill the spirit of Islam in their followers (*Ministry of Information Plateau State*, September 15, 1980).

Dann (1995) reported on an attempted lynching of a Housewife Eucharia Paulinus Ebizoeme and her four year old son, on Tuesday, August 8, 1995, in their Tudun Kwandere area of Lafia, in Plateau State. They narrowly escaped death by the whiskers, but for the police who foiled an attempt to lynch her and her son by some people suspected to be Muslim fundamentalists, for allegedly desecrating a portion of the Holy Qur'an. The housewife, a nursing mother, had

asked her four year old son to get her a paper that she would use to clean up the baby's faeces. Her little son, Samuel, went outside the house and innocently picked up a rough sheet which turned out to be a page of the Holy Qur'an and gave to his mother. A Muslim, one Mohammed Abdullahi, who saw little Samuel pick up the piece of paper and gave to his mother, quickly raised an alarm that attracted some fellow Muslims, who without further investigation pounced on Madam Eucharia and were about to lynch her and her children. Only the prompt intervention of the police averted the lynching (*This Day*, August 13, 1995: 2).

Mangul (1996) reported another ethno-religious conflict between Christians and Muslims on March 17, 1996. The conflict started when one Azi Izang Chai, a 35 year old Christian, was attacked and killed when he allegedly challenge some hoodlums engaged in multiple voting in the Muslim-dominated Angwa Rogogo area during the local government elections held nationwide. His brutal assassination aggravated the existing rivalry between the predominantly Christian indigenes and the Hausa community of Angwan Rogogo. The conflict allegedly assumed further religious inclination when the Plateau State branch of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) decided to take on the burial responsibility of the late Chai.

The state government, however, refused to release the corpse of Chai to the CAN authority at that tension-soaked period, and instead went to deposit it at the Jos University Teaching Hospital. The state government had only planned

to release the body after the conclusion of the election, fearing that if it had been released earlier; hoodlums might use that opportunity to foment trouble. But the CAN, bent on burying him as planned, sent a one-time commissioner of Education in Plateau State, Williams Ishaya, to assure the government that the burial would be devoid of violence. With his intervention, the corpse was approved to be released to the CAN authorities. The corpse was supposed to have been promptly released to the mourners at 9.00 AM, mourners and sympathizers, therefore, gathered at the Jos University Teaching Hospital as scheduled. However, due to the protocol of signing approval papers for the release of corpses, the corpse was not released until about 1.30 PM.

With the release of the corpse closer to the Muslim Friday worship hour, the authorities might have unwittingly programmed the unfolding events preparatory for a conflict. However, the cortege left the mortuary chanting funeral songs as they headed for the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN), located on Sarkin Mangu Street, the same street as the central mosque. But the Muslims preparatory for the Friday Jumaat prayer had barricaded the road for an uninterrupted worship.

When the funeral procession got to the barricade, which they must pass to get to the church for the funeral service, the Muslim volunteers manning it refused them access as they and probably other Muslim worshippers had considered the procession provocative, coinciding with the time for their Friday Jumaat prayer. Despite the refusal, the Christians were determinedly set to use

the road to get to their church, which was about a hundred meters from the mosque. As the Christians began to dismantle the barricade, they were pelted with stones and other dangerous missiles by the Muslim volunteers manning the barricade. Several people were injured in the process. The situation was further aggravated by the jittery policemen who fired several canisters of tear gas at the warring group (*New Nigeria*, March 24, 1996: 13-14).

On Friday July 6, 2001, Jos town was thrown into yet another violent religious conflict. The immediate cause of the carnage was a slight misunderstanding between Muslims and a Christian lady who was said to be passing near a mosque at Eto-Baba, a Jos suburb during Jumaat prayer. The lady, ostensibly, was passing through an already barricaded road, preparatory for the Jumaat prayer. For her refusal to turn back, the lady in question was allegedly beaten up by some Muslim people. On hearing the news, her people who were Christians mobilized themselves and set out on a revenge mission. The ensuing skirmish turned out to be a major conflict (*City Watch*, July 12, 2001:15).

Igoh (2002) reported another violent religious conflict on April 2002, in which hundreds of people were killed and several houses burnt down broke out in Dilimi, Plateau State. A girl had allegedly tried to cross a barricade erected by Muslims during the Friday Jumaat prayer. She was turned back by the Muslim volunteers who were manning the barricade, but she refused and was attacked in the process. This led to a violent ethno-religious conflict that lasted

for days. The conflict was said to have been aggravated by the Imam of the mosque.

At the height of the mayhem, the Imam was reported to have called for prayers several times at very odd time. When the prayers were called, a large population of young men would rush into the mosque to meet him and to receive instructions spurring them to fight to finish as in the days of the holy Jihad when the Jihadists conquered Mecca and destroyed idolatry (*City Watch*, April 12, 2002:7)

Obadiah (2004) reported another bloody attack in Plateau State on February 15, 2004. The attack was launched by some unknown armed soldiers on Lyanjit village in Langtang North Local Government Area with the full knowledge of the Emir of Wase, Haruna Adullahi Maikano, who was believed to be strongly behind the attack. The emir was reported to have secured the services of armed soldiers from neighbouring Bauchi State through Yuli Bashar Road to help in training the ethnic militia, most of who were confirmed to have come from the neighbouring Niger and Chad Republics. They were camped in Wase town, in Lamba, Bashar and Maro districts allegedly at the expense of the emirate council. The insurgents invaded Hamele village on February 12, 2004, having displaced the mobile policemen, mounting security in Wase town and border villages like Duwi, Yaudere, Kirin, Hamele and Tsamiya. During the conflict, more than forty-six bicycles and motorcycles were carted away while houses were either torched or demolished.

No fewer than 1,500 Gemai people were said to have been killed and 60,000 others displaced in Shendam Local Government Council of Plateau State in the conflict. The current wave of hostility began on February 15, 2004, when some armed militias were noticed around Shimanker and consequently reported to the relevant authorities in Shendam. The attempt by the police to investigate the allegation led to the killing of four policemen on an attack on Lyanjit village (*Tell*, March 15, 2004: 7).

Andrew (2004:7-8) reported another round of religious conflict in Plateau State on Sunday, February 22, 2004. On that faithful day, Yamim village was completely destroyed by Fulani herdsmen who claimed they were chasing cattle rustlers. This resulted in the invasion of the village. After the village was sacked, the Fulani militias allegedly hoisted the portrait of Osama bin Laden in Yelwa-Shendam, which was also declared as part of Zamfara State. Despite moves by the authority of Shendam Local Government Council to impose a night curfew on the area, strong resistance was allegedly made by the influential Hausa-Fulani resulting in a no curfew scheme.

Following their success in stalling the imposition of a curfew, the youths in Yelwa-Shendam mounted loudspeakers of all shapes and sizes chanting all manner of Islamic Slogans calling Christians “Infidel”. In the madness that ensued, the settlement of Nshar, adjacent to Yelwa was completely razed down and many people killed. The Nshar yam market, churches, residential buildings and their four health facilities all went up in flames. This was closely followed

by the destruction of Aji Kamel, Lukushim, Tumbi, Tukung, Goedo, Mangoro and Kwapjur. The death toll in this conflict stood at 1,500. Most of the victims were either roasted or slaughtered. A few days later, 48 people were killed in Yelwa town as hostilities within the Southern Senatorial Zone of Plateau State continued to spread and engulf more villages.

The victims, this time around, included women and children, who had run into Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) in Yelwa to seek refuge where they were allegedly pursued, and brutally slaughtered and set ablaze. It was gathered that the May 9th attack was a reprisal for the Kano and COCIN attacks. In all, over 200 people were killed in the conflicts (*Tell*, March 15, 2004: 7-8).

Shobayo (2010:1-4) reported another deadly religious conflict in Jos Plateau on January 17-19, 2010. The conflict started on Sunday in Nassarawa Gwong, a Suburb of the city of Jos the state capital. Over 26 persons were killed on that day when the conflict broke out between Christians and Muslims. The conflict was brought under control by the state government, which imposed a dusk to dawn curfew. The conflict was however escalated when some armed persons reportedly stormed the city in defiance of the curfew. This action made the conflict to spread to other parts of the city like Rikos, Yanshanu, and Barkin Ladi. All activities in the city of Jos and its environs were grounded to a halt (*Daily Trust*, January 18, 2010: 5).

The conflict further spread on the third day to other camps that include Sabon Gida Kanar, Gyero, Bisichi, Dogon Na Hauwa, Rayfield, Maiadiko and

Rafin Bauna. All structures in these camps were razed to the ground. Other areas affected by the conflict were Kuru Karama, Kuru Babba and Kuru Janta. No house was left standing in these areas. The conflict remain an unfolding tragedy as those affected counted their losses in lives at over 1000 and property worth billions of naira. The injured and displaced people are put at about 40,000 (Daily Trust, February 3, 2010:14). As if that was not enough, the mayhem of March 7, 2010 at Dogon na Hauwa where over 500 people mostly women and children were killed (*The Nation*, March 8, 2010:1-2 and *Daily trust*, March 8, 2010:1-5).

The December 24, 2010, Christmas Eve, according to Akowe (2010), witnessed a new and ominous dimension which was added to the lingering religious conflicts in Jos Plateau. That day, bombs exploded in three different parts of Christian domination in the city, killing over 80 people, wounding many more and destroying churches and mosques and property worth millions of naira as a result of the crises that followed it (*The Nation*, December 28, 2010:1-2).

2.6 Ethnic conflicts in Plateau State

In 1987, Jos Plateau witnessed the eruption of some ethnic conflicts. First were the Hausa and Berom ethnic conflict in Jos South Local Government Council which was allegedly over the indigene-settler syndrome. Also in the same year, the Mwaghavul and the Pyem communities in Mangu Local

Government Area were involved in conflicts allegedly over chieftaincy disputes. These conflicts resulted in the loss lives and millions of Naira worth of property (*Ministry of Information Plateau State, September 15, 1980*).

Izang (1997) reported that the Hausa in Jos were engaged on another violent ethnic conflict in April 10, 1997. The conflict sparked up on accusation of theft of farm produce by the Berom people. It was alleged that on Tuesday, April 8, 1997, some Onions were stolen from the farm of one Ibrahim a Hausa man, by some Berom men. So, by Wednesday, Ibrahim and two of his sons left home in the evening to mount sentry at the farm along Rangel Road. At about 8.00 pm, some three Berom, apparently returning from the mining field, were sighted by Ibrahim and his sons. He flashed his torch at them and said “so you are the ones who have been stealing my farm produce, God has caught up with you today.” As he and the three Berom men argued, the population of the Berom increased.

When about thirteen others joined them to defend their kin from any attack from the Hausa man, there was a scuffle. The Hausa man said that it was one of the Berom men who first hit one of his sons. In further self defense, Ibrahim was said to have hit one of the Berom men on the forehead with his hoe. The young man fell down. After hitting him, Ibrahim rushed to Gyero town and met with Muhammadu Dula Saleh, the Mai Angwa of Gyero. He explained the situation to their leader, who in turn accompanied him to the police post in Gyero. A Sergeant on duty advised that the case be reported

directly to the Police in Bukuru Headquarter of the Jos South Local Government Area. But even before the team from Gyero left Bukuru, the corpse of the Berom man who was hit by Ibrahim arrived the town. It was immediately taken to Jos, while the Mai Angwa was told to return home. He returned to Gyero at 4.00 AM to await the district police officer who promised to visit the town. The story took a gristly turn in the morning when angry Berom allegedly attacked Gyero and razed about 27 houses down. About ten cars were burnt and many other properties worth thousands of naira were destroyed. At the last count, about 17 people were reported killed (*Tell*, May 12, 1997: 3-4).

Ahuwa (2001) reported another communal clash on March 17, 2001, where the Quaan Pan Community was thrown into ethnic conflict following the attack of Tiv compounds in Kundum village of Barkin Chiyawa in Kwande District by some marauders suspected to be Tuaregs ethnic militia. A Kwall man, Anthony Dafaa, and some members of his family were killed. This incident resulted in a reprisal attack by unknown persons suspected to have been hired to avenge the death of the Kwall man (*New Nigeria*, March 19, 2001:5).

Nanchan (2001) reported another ethnic conflict which occurred on March, 30, 2001, in Plateau State when Shendam town fell into the hands of people suspected to be marauders. These marauders mercilessly unleashed terror on the inhabitants of Zendesha compounds of Gidan Zuni village, leaving

in its wake burnt houses, animals and food stuff belonging to the Tiv (*This Day*, April 8, 2001:17).

Fombuat (2002) reported that the Hausa-Fulani and Taroh of the Wase Local Government Area were involved in another violent ethnic conflict in July 4, 2002. This was allegedly a spill over of the June 27, 2002 ethno-religious conflict between two ethnic groups in Yelwa town of Shendam Local Government Area, also in the Southern Senatorial Zone more than 20 people were killed and property worth thousands of naira were destroyed. There were different versions of the real reason behind the conflict.

According to Solomon Lar, an Elder Statesman of Plateau State and a Taroh man, the conflict in the area had to do with the agitation by the Taroh people in Wase Local Government Council for a separate local government area of their own. The local government, if created, they said, would be known as Kadarko Local Government Council; with headquarters in Kadarko a district in Wase Local Government Council. It was later split into several districts by the state government. Infuriated by the agitation for the creation of the local government, Lar said the Hausa-Fulani organized and attacked the Taroh people resulting in the fight which spread to other Taroh Villages and towns, like Gwiwan-Kogi, Angwan Gere, Takalafiya, Jigwawan Audu, Mer, Sauwe, Tenan, Ruoji, Ungwa Sayawa and Angwan Bala(*The Source*, July 8, 2002:20-22).

However, another version of the cause of the conflict was the one being touted by the Plateau State Government. Patrick Dakum, the State

Commissioner for Information said that the conflict was sparked off by the directives given by the leaders of the Christians and Muslims to their adherents. According to him, the CAN had earlier given an order prohibiting young female Christians from having anything to do with their Male Muslim counterparts. Irked by this directive, the Muslims also retaliated by prohibiting their adherents from buying foods sold by Christians. “It was this type of directive which precipitated tension that resulted in the conflict we are witnessing today”. About 200 people were said to have been killed and over 50,000 people displaced as at July 16, 2002. The number of refugees and displaced people fled the conflict-ridden state and who had took refuge in schools and public places was put at 300, 827 (*The Source*, July 8, 2002:20-22).

Otula (2002) reported that in the same 2002, another fresh outbreak of ethnic hostility between the indigenes and Fulani herdsmen in Kassa village of Barkin Ladi Local Government Area in Plateau State occurred. The attack was allegedly masterminded by armed men who invaded the village in the early hours of the morning and attacked several men. Several houses were burnt or damaged in the process. About nine people, including a police sergeant were reportedly killed in the process. The following Berom villages were also attacked by people suspected to be Hausa-Fulani militia: Heipang, Vom, Fan Ropp, and Chistake. (*The Source*, July 22, 2002:19). Further, hostilities between Fulani herdsmen and Berom in 2002 in Barkin Ladi and Riyom Local Government Areas of Plateau State spread into villages in Jos South Local

Government Area. Report claimed that about 20 deaths were recorded in the raging hostilities and several others were injured.

Elisha (2003) reported that youths (bandits), said to be numbering about 3000 and wielding sophisticated weapons, poisonous arrows and bows, invaded Kadarko village; the largest Taroh settlement in Wase Local Government Area in March 20, 2003. Report claimed that between 52 and 63 people were killed in the attack. Less than a week after the attack, another round of invasion of the same village by bandits was recorded. In the attack, thirty people, including a policeman were reported dead, and several houses razed. It was alleged that some of the bandits were dressed in the Nigerian Army uniform. On April 11, 2003, Wase town was also attacked by some people suspected to be Taroh. About 7 people were reportedly killed in the process (*News Watch*, April 15, 2003:14).

Abubakar (2004) reported that in May 18 and 19, 2004, barely 24 hours after a state of emergency was imposed on Plateau State, a fresh violent ethnic conflict was said to have erupted between the Hausa-fulani and indigenes at Sabon Gada village in the Quaan Pan Local Government Area of Plateau State. The attackers according to the council Chairman, Danjuma Daniel, were armed with guns, bows and arrows and came from the neighbouring villages of Akiri and Azara in Nassarawa State.

There were reports of killings in Yelwa Shendam a day before. The attack was said to be unprecedented in planning and execution as the attackers

allegedly had a field day killing and burning. The onslaught lasted till the early hours of the following day. At the end, not less than 350 people were believed to have been killed.

For the Quaan Pan conflict, several houses and property worth millions of naira were said to have been burnt in the incident. Farmlands were not spared either. The conflict spread to other villages that include; Bakin Chiyawa, Kurgari, Gidan Sabo, Saminaka and Sabon Gida where unspecified number of casualties was recorded. Following the violent conflict, over 18,000 people were said to have been displaced from their homes while 14,000 went to kara refugee camp in Lafia, Nassarawa state (*Daily Trust*, November 1, 2004:1)

Jos North Local Government witnessed another ethnic conflict in November 28–30, 2008. Mohammed (2009) argued that the conflict was triggered up by political differences surrounding the Jos North Local Government elections, but eventually hijacked by xenophobic and misguided elements to complete the annihilation and extermination of Hausa/Fulani and indeed the Muslim community in Plateau State, a process according to him which began since September, 2001. The conflict according to other sources, started as a result of the state government inability to conduct a peaceful, fair and free local government election. This created an opportunity for political thugs and misguided individuals to unleash violence conflict in Jos (*Daily Trust*, January 30, 2009: 2).

Contrary to the above reasons for the 2008 conflict in Jos, the commission of inquiry of prince Bola Ajibola set up by the Plateau State government to find out the causes of frequent eruption of ethno-sectarian conflicts in Jos, the state capital blames it on the former military president General Ibrahim Babangida who created Jos North Local Council. According to the commission's report, the creation of the Jos North Local Council has been a tinderbox. The November 2008 conflict recorded Wanton destruction of lives and property. The commission said that it received as claims of property destroyed, over ₦43, billion. While 4,815 structures as well as 167 cars were claimed to have been damaged during the unrest, it also said the actual number of persons who lost their lives in the 2008 conflict stands at 312, as it could not verify claims by Human Rights Watch that the Muslim community recorded 632 deaths.

However, the commission agreed that the Muslim community "suffered massive casualties" during the conflict, it blamed elements of the Hausa/Fulani Muslim community for initiating acts of violence that led to the conflict. The commission further observed that:

Despite the coincidence of time, the local government election of 2008 was not the immediate cause of the unrest, but the feeling that the Hausa/Fulani had lost the election and had, by that token, lost access to one of the major opportunities for economic domination and advancement among their people, pushed them to violence.

The commission absolved governor Jang of complicity in the 2008 conflict. It however recommended that the police be made to investigate the activities of some prominent persons in the state, including former Deputy Senate president, Ibrahim Mantu, Saleh Hassan, Yahaya Jengre, Samaila Mohammed and Dasuki Ibrahim Nakande. The commission said that those people utterances before and after the conflict was capable of igniting more conflicts in the future (*The News*, March 1, 2010: 29).

An interesting feature of the 2008 Jos North conflicts has been the sophistication in the weapons used and the recruitment of mercenaries both within and outside the country. Most people interviewed admitted that the conflicts were not only premeditated, but the weapons used pointed to the fact that the conflicts was meticulously planned. There were also allegations that hundreds of armed mercenaries sporting fake police and military uniforms were apprehended by security operatives during the conflicts. The fact that the mercenaries were imported either from neighbouring countries or from states adjoining Plateau State underscored the fact that the crisis was premeditated, pre-planned and dastardly executed with a view to causing mindless mayhem and tainting or influencing the outcome of the election in Jos North Local Government area. There were also serious allegations of complicity on the part of some members of the armed forces and security agencies from the two sides to the conflict. The quantum of arms that was used by both sides also pointed to

some measure of planning and stockpiling, which raises national security concerns (Omuora M.A. *The Guardian*, January 12, 2009:4).

These kinds of allegations of complicity against the security agencies in Jos Plateau conflicts made a spokesman of an NGO in (2002) to remark that:

Crises in Jos are more difficult to isolate and contain than any other in Nigerian... When armed forces and security operative take side instead of being neutral, there is certainly a tendency towards polarization, which further breeds more violence (...) A major issue in this conflict is the belief that people were imported from within and outside the country to orchestrate the conflict. While I cannot authoritatively state that mercenaries were brought in, the weapons used here admits to a process of arduous planning. I feel and I also think that this is the position of other civil society organizations, that the Federal Government should investigate this claim.

2.7 Political conflicts in plateau State

Usman (1994) reported another violent conflict on April 12, 1994, which erupted between the Hausas and the natives over the appointment of an individual that was perceived as a non-indigene by the indigenous tribe. The then military administrator of Plateau State, Mohammed Mana, had announced appointments into the caretaker committee of the twenty-three local government councils in the state. The Appointment of Mato, as Management Committee Chairman of Jos North Local Government Council was, however, considered a miscalculation (*The Guardian*, April 17, 1994:3-4).

The Anagustas, Beroms and Afizeres, who are natives of Jos North Local Government Council, were quick to register their displeasure and resentment of the appointment. Yet, the military administrator seemed not to be bothered. To

him, Mato would be sworn in as management committee chairman of Jos north Local Government.

On the swearing-in day, the police had to disperse the crowd of angry mob with tear gas. Yet, the natives despite the lachrymatory fumes from the exploded tear gas stood their ground firmly. Mato, although sworn in was not allowed into the office to perform the functions of the chairman. This is because, the Jos North Local Government Secretariat was invaded by the natives and had its gates barricaded.

A complication according to Usman (1994), emerged from the situation on ground when the Hausa group to which Mato belongs insisted that having been sworn in, their son must be allowed to occupy the exalted office. The next day witnessed a massive demonstration by Hausa youths as a mark of solidarity and support for their newly sworn in chairman. In the ensuing fracas, several people sustained serious injuries and the Jos Main Market, the best of its kind in the West Coast of Africa, was set ablaze (The Guardian, April 17, 1994: 5).

Datung (1997) reported the Chngal and Panyam ethnic conflict of April 5 and 6, 1997. Chngal which has a long-standing history of ethnic conflicts is a border town between Gindiri and Panyam District of Mangu Local Government Area of Plateau State. The Gindiri people speak Pyam language, which is also the native tongue of Ibrahim Nasir Mantu, a prominent politician. The Panyam, however, speak the Mwaghavul language. Residents of Chngal, naturally feel they belong to Gindiri District. Trouble allegedly reared its head when the

district head of Panyam appointed a new Galadima for the Changal people (*Tell*, May 12, 1997:3-4).

Fitina Kwarshek was appointed by the Panyam leader so that he could collect taxes (Haraji) from Changal for remittance to Panyam. But before that appointment, there had been a Galadima, called Ibrahim Sambo, who had always collected taxes from Changal. Galadima Ibrahim Sambo, had for years sent the amount collected to Gindiri. When Panyam, therefore, appointed a chief in the person of Kwarshek, the people of Changal did not support him, and the elders insisted that the district head of Gindiri should appoint a new head for Changal. Consequently, Adamu Nagarko Ali was named and installed as the “Rit” that is, Sarkin (or district head) of Changal. This infuriated the Panyam people who saw it as an affront. The people of Changal found themselves in between two leaders fighting for control over the land, money and people.

Consequently, the Panyam people on Sunday April 6, 1997, attacked the Changal with bows and arrows. About 200 houses were allegedly burnt in Changal and its neighboring villages. The district head of Gindiri and Panyam who were summoned to Jos by the then Military Administrator of the State, Habibu Shaibu, were charged to a magistrate court for allegedly instigating the people to riot (*Tell*, May 12, 1997: 3-4).

Since September 7, 2001, when the Jos major ethno-religious conflicts broke out, leaving many people dead and resulting in the destruction of property

worth millions of naira, Plateau State has unfortunately been through one conflict after another. These conflicts which always start in Jos quickly spreads to all the senatorial zones in the state and since then the situation has continued intermittently.

Ibrahim (2001) reported another violent conflict which began on Friday September 7, 2001. The conflict emanated when one Muhammed Mukta-Usman, a Muslim, was appointed as coordinator and chairman of the Jos North monitoring committee of the National Poverty Eradication Programme (NAPEP). Usman was said to be a non-indigene. His appointment therefore, sparked off debates over who truly owns Jos. The indigenes were said to have vowed that Muktar would be removed, while the Hausa-Fulani, Usman's tribesmen, reportedly insisted that nothing must change the status quo (*New Nigeria*, September 30, 2001:13-15).

Therefore, immediately after Usman's appointment, the Christian indigenes in the state had protested, insisting that he was not an indigene and that the state had its own slot being occupied by a non-indigene of the state. Consequently, a press statement was thus issued by Plateau Youth Council (PYC), condemning the appointment because Usman, notwithstanding being born in Jos, was a settler. After the press statement, posters were pasted around the town with inscriptions like: "Trace your roots before it is too late," "The devil has no parking space in Jos North," "You are warned once again not to

step in,” “Go and tell them you are not interested anymore because your life is at stake,” and “Run for your life” (*New Nigeria*, September 30, 2001:14).

Apart from the posters, human faeces were dumped in Usman’s office by unknown persons. When these actions to provoke the Hausa community failed, a statement which was purportedly issued by the Hausa-Fulani’s Jasawa Development Association (JDA) emerged, calling on the people of Jos North Local Government Area to vote a Muslim as the council chairman in the next local government election. The PYC’s Chairman, Yakubu Ibrahim Itse, hinged on it to address a press conference in which he told the Hausa-Fulani community in Jos that they had no citizenship right in the state. He further called for the removal of Turakin Jos, Inuwa Ali, from the Jos traditional council and the scrapping of all Hausa-Fulani chieftaincy titles in all traditional councils in the state. A violent conflict between the Hausa-Fulani sympathetic to Usman and the indigenes thus ensued. Properties worth millions of naira were damaged in the process. The areas worst hit according to report include Nassaraw Gwom, Jenta Adamu, Anglo Jos, Angwan Rogo, Apata, Tudun-Wada and Bukuru. A dusk to dawn curfew was imposed on the city before the situation was brought under control (*New Nigeria*, September 30, 2001:15).

Frank (2002) reported another ugly incident in Jos Plateau where a Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) disagreement in Naraguta ward “B” of Jos North triggered off a conflict on Thursday May 2, 2002, which led to another

bloody sectarian violence. The conflict was as a result of the rescheduled ward, local government and state congress primaries of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP). Violence was sparked by a sharp disagreement between two rival groups within PDP at Eto-Baba and Angwan Rukuba wards of Jos North Local Government Area.

As a prelude to a forth-coming election, each of the factions worked towards imposing their candidates as party executives at the ward level. A faction of the party was said to have brought under-aged youths and elderly people from Bauchi and Maiduguri to participate in the congress. This was opposed by the rival group. The conflict started with a trivial argument that later degenerated into a brawl. Several people were stabbed in the process. The violent conflict later spread to Hausa-Fulani-dominated areas like Dogon Dutse, Bauchi Road, and Angwan Rogo, Filling Bell junction at Nassarawa and Zowlo Junction along Bauchi Road. About fifteen people were reportedly killed in the mayhem. The Plateau State Police Command later imposed a dusk to dawn curfew in Jos, Buruku and its environs (*Newswatch*, May 20, 2002:47).

A dusk to dawn curfew was imposed on some four local government areas of Plateau State following another bloody clash in Yelwa town in Shendam Local Government Council which resulted in the death of about twenty people. The towns include Mabudi, Langtang, Kargwi and Wase. Many people sustained injuries in the fracas. Several worship centres, six petrol filling

stations and 22 vehicles were burnt or vandalized before the situation was brought under control by a combined team of military and police personnel.

The fracas was allegedly sparked off by an illicit love affair between a Hausa youngster and a female indigene in Yelwa town, where the indigenes had for some time frowned at any love affair between their girls and Hausa men. In any case, the local girl was accosted and beaten up. It was further gathered that unable to watch his lover being beaten, the young Romeo ran to the girl's rescue. It soon became a free-for-all fight (*News Watch*, May 20, 2002: 47).

The political conflict of April 18, 2011 was another conflict that took place in Jos the Plateau State capital. According to National Mirror of April 19, 2011, angered Hausa/Fulani community youths were protesting the outcome of the April 16, 2011 presidential election which put President Jonathan ahead of other candidates. One Sabiu Musa reported that the protesting Hausa/Fulani youths were particularly not happy that General Buhari lost the election to President Jonathan.

The youths came out in large numbers brandishing dangerous weapons including knives and cutlasses and barricaded major roads around Terminus Area, chanting anti PDP slogans. Soon, the protesting youth resorted to burning of tyres on the roads and blocking motorists. They went further to attacking and burning of some houses belonging to PDP stalwarts and some people perceived to be associates of the party in Jos North Local Government Area. Areas mostly

affected by the crises include Nasarawa Gwom, Dilimi area and Duala all in Jos North Local Government Area.

As a result, business activities were paralyzed as traders including banks, who earlier opened for business quickly closed shops and scampered for safety. The News of the incident quickly spread to other parts of Jos town, causing commotion. The incident took the serious police intervention to nip the crises in the bud. (*National Mirror*, April 19, 2011:53)

2.8 Land dispute conflicts in Plateau State

Sadau (1991) reported another conflict in Gura District of Plateau State in 1991 where two communities took up arms against each other allegedly over a parcel of land in Dar'a. The Attal and Attaka communities each of them were claiming the land under dispute. They therefore, chose to resolve the dispute by sacrificing innocent blood (*News Watch*, October 28, 1991: 18).

Arago (1995) reported another conflict between the Mwaghavuls of Mangu Local Government Area and the Rons of Bokkos Local Government Area in 1995 over boundary disputes. The disagreement between farmers in these respective villages over a piece of land bordering their boundaries had seen them in and out of court. With the passage of time, particularly at the onset of cropping season, there was always a scramble for available pieces of land for farming purposes. This act generated interest by the groups involved in the disputes to acquire more of the available farmland in spite of a subsisting court order. This took its toll on inter-communal relationship as violent conflict

between the concerned communities erupted. Property and lives were said to have been lost in the conflict (*City Watch*, September 4, 1995: 9).

Eneche (2001) reported another communal clash between the Tiv people and their neighbours in the Quaan pan Local Government Area In March 25, 2001, over farmland. The Tiv people resident in Quaan pan had accused the Asiko, a traditional ruler in the area, of confiscating their land and giving it to his people. It was alleged that the Tiv people, felt aggrieved and a misunderstanding, which led to a violent conflict, ensued. There was extensive destruction of property and reported cases of death of the warring parties involved (*New Nigeria*, March 27, 2001: 4-6).

Idiris (2001) reported another violent incident in plateau State where fighting was said to have occurred between April 11 and 15, 2001, in Wase Local Government Area following a disagreement over who should harvest locust bean tree in Nassarawa village of Wase. A Taroh man was reported to have bought a piece of land from a Burum man. The Burum man who sold the piece of land had long died, but the children were still living. In the tradition of the Burums, they do not sell a piece of land with any economic tree. You may buy the land, but the economic tree remains theirs even if it is on your property. When the children of the late Burum man came to pluck the fruit of the locust bean tree, the Taroh man refused. This led to fight that resulted to the killing of one of the Burum men's children in the process.

Sources claim that the fighting would not have escalated but for some religious undertones it escalated. Taroh men were generally regarded as having expansionist instincts by nature and ordinarily feel superior to their neighbours. This attribute understandably makes the Taroh men ready enemies. Besides, the Tarohs are largely Christians while their neighbours in Wase who include Jarawa, Basharawa, Jukuns, Hausas and Fulanis are Muslims. These people did not need any serious prompting to fight the Taroh as they had always had sympathy for the Burums who are predominantly Muslims. The Taroh had come to settle in Wase and were the second largest ethnic group in the area, which has about eight ethnic groups (*The source*, April 18, 2001: 8-9).

As a result of the lands conflict in Wase, a reprisal attack was launched on Muslims in Langtang town. The reasons for the conflict were tied to the disagreement in Langtang involving individual Muslims and the natives. It was also aggravated by spill over of earlier ethnic conflicts in nearby Kanan Local Government Area. This led to the displacement of the Taroh of Wase who fled to become refugees in Langtang North Local Government Area. Consequently, the conflict left many people injured and several properties were either damaged or burnt. Most Muslims in the Christian-dominated Langtang were allegedly thrown into the open fields as refugees (*The source*, April 18, 2001, 8-9).

Batch (2004) reported on another land conflict took place in Wase town on February 8, 2004. The conflict was said to have been instigated by the

demolition of houses owned by Christians who were returning to Yaudere village along Wase-Langtang Road. The houses were said to have been demolished by the Waziri allegedly because they were illegal structures. This led to a violent confrontation between the Waziri, his subjects and the aggrieved Christians. No arrest was made (*New Nigeria*, February 10, 2004: 2).

These conflicts have turned Plateau State from being “the home of peace and tourism” to “the home of violent conflicts and crises”. It is a known fact that, even at the time of putting this work together secret killings are still going on between Christians and Muslims in most parts of the state. This has therefore forced many people to relocate either to neighbouring or their home states to begin life afresh.

CHAPTER THREE
THE CAUSES OF ETHNO – RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS IN
KADUNA AND PLATEAU STATES

3.1 Oral and Documentary Sources

Oral interviews on the causes of ethnic and religious conflicts in Kaduna and Plateau states were conducted on a sampled population of about 150 people, that is, 75 people in each state. Through the interviews conducted information was obtained from both Christians and Muslims groups. These include leaders and faithful of Christianity and Islam, Government officials, Law Enforcement Agents, business men and women, teachers and students of tertiary institutions etc. these interviews were conducted from six randomly selected Local Government Councils in Kaduna State and from another six Local Government Councils in Plateau State. These include: Kaduna North and South Local Governments, Zangon Kataf Local Government, Jema'a Local Government, Zaria Local Government and Lere Local Government Council all in Kaduna State. While in Plateau State Jos North and South Local Governments, Wase Local Government, Lantang North Local Government, Panshin Local Government and Barkin Ladi Local Government Government were used for the study.

The interviews captured the feelings and mood of some Nigerians both indigenes and non-indigenes on the causes of the conflicts. The causes include amongst others: religious causes, poverty/unemployment, poor security

network, political causes, ethnic migration/indigene-settler causes, constitutional violation, electoral malpractice and political intolerance, economic causes, external influence, poor standard of education, and non implementation of conflicts reports by government. These are discussed in the above order.

3.2 Religious Causes

Yusuf, Y.A, (interviewed: August 2, 2010), a civil servant in Kaduna stated that the various ethno – religious conflicts in the country should be blamed on tribal sentiments and religious bigotry. According to Yusuf, people attach a lot of sentiments to their religious beliefs than respect and loyalty to this nation. He said that it is high time for Nigerians to start seeing themselves as one irrespective of their tribal and religious differences. He further maintained that, unless Nigerians learn to mutually respect one another and live together then, they should be prepared to be faced with more of such ugly crises.

Ansalem, I.O. (interviewed: August 3, 2010), a business man in Kaduna blamed the conflicts on the unguided utterances of religious leaders. According to Ansalem, it has been observed quite often on how the preaching and selfishness of some religious leaders incite their followers against the practitioners of other religions. He therefore, called on all religious leaders to fear God and educate their followers on the positive lessons of their religions.

Mustafa, J.J. (interviewed: August 4, 2010), a politician in Zaria, blamed the conflicts in Kaduna and Plateau States on tribal sentiments and not religious as some people always portray it. He said Kaduna and Plateau States that were known to be very peaceful in the past years are now assuming a different dimension that should be the concern of all well meaning individuals in the two States. He therefore called on all people to always tour the path of peace not only in Kaduna and Plateau States but in the country at large.

Bala, A.H. (interviewed: August 7, 2010), a civil servant in Kaduna blamed, the conflicts in Kaduna in the year 2000 over the proposed implementation of the Sharia Legal System in the State on government poor sensitization of people on the concept of ‘Sharia’. He therefore, called on government to live up to its responsibilities of educating all stakeholders in critical decisions on sensitive matters.

Haruna, I. (interviewed: August 10, 2010), an Islamic Cleric in Zangon Kataf stated that, the Zangon Kataf conflict of 1992 was as a result of land dispute involving the Kataf and the Hausa but metamorphosed into a religious conflicts. Haruna however regretted over the crises and prayed against a reoccurrence of such in the area. Similarly, (Peter, S.interview: August 10, 2010), a Pastor in Zangon kataf blamed the religious conflicts in Kaduna and Plateau; and other States of the North on government preferential treatment of the two major religions (Christianity and Islam). He maintained that so long as the government continues to treat or promote one religion over the other and by

refusing to keep to the secular nature of the Nigerian nation, these conflicts will continue.

Hilary, S. (Interviewed: June 15, 2010), a secondary school teacher in Jos North Local Government blamed the conflicts on the poor leadership examples of Islam and Christianity. According to him, most of the leaders of the two religions instead of teaching their faithful the positive aspect of their religious doctrines, they spent their times inciting the faithful against each others religions. Here therefore advised that it is high time for people under such types of leaders to discover the truth on their own and find a way of living peaceful with each other irrespective of our differences in religion.

Achunike (2007:7) identified some causes to these conflicts in the modern day religious practices which includes two of the following:

a) **Claims of revelations:** Unguarded claim to exclusive revelations to God who despite all human efforts remains unknown. Muslims however claim that they have total knowledge of God. Christians equally have the same claim and even the African Traditional Religion (ATR). These claims of ultimate knowledge of God by adherents of religions create forms of social conflicts.

b) **Pride:** Proud people have the tendency of looking down on others under the claim that they have something which others will never have also leads to conflict when applied to religion.

Furthermore, Sunday in Achunike (2007) identified other eight factors that also lead to inter religious conflicts:

1. **Wrong Perception of Other People's Religions or their Faith:**

This portrays looking at other people's religious activities with levity which often leads to conflict. This is true particularly when we know that every religion promises its adherents salvation and hope.

2. **Wrong Religious Orientation:** People are taught differently under different religions. When wrong methods are used in indoctrinating adherents of a particular religion, what often follows is religious obsession which invariably leads to conflict.

3. **Literacy Level of Religious Adherents:** Every Nigerian belongs to onreligion or another, but not too many Nigerians are educated. Since people often believe what their religious leaders say; illiterates are easily manipulated to achieve one selfish aim or another since they are not critical and logical in their thinking.

4. **Selfishness on the Part of Religious Personalities:** Some religious leaders, despite their calling, are given to selfishness. They employ fowl means to perpetrate religious conflicts knowing that they will be invited by the government in power to seek their consent. That way, they get closer to the government for their personal interest.

5. Too Much Freedom Given to Religious Leaders:

It appears that too much freedom is accorded religious leaders in Nigeria. Anybody can carry microphone and say whatever he or she likes in the name of religion. There is no censor for religious preachers. Pronouncement

Therefore pronouncements from such could lead to social conflict.

Clara, N.A. (interviewed: August 11, 2010), a business woman in Kafanchan blamed the conflicts on religious fundamentalism. That is, the so-called religious zealots. She therefore called on government to strongly discourage such religious fundamentalists' acts for the interest of peace and unity in the country but in Kaduna and Plateau States in particular.

Ja'afaru (2004:2) also, commenting on some of the key causes of ethnic and religious conflicts and intolerance asserted that:

A lot of Christians misunderstand or rather have misconceptions on a number of things about Islam and Muslims. The same happens with a lot of Muslims about Christianity. And sincerely speaking, these misconceptions are the causes of the absence of reasonable peace amongst us; they are all the works of the devil, which we must join, hands in fighting.

Kukah(1993:190) blamed the conflicts on sentiments and emotions of worshippers, proliferation of religious sects, fanaticism, too much freedom given to religious leaders and feelings of marginalization, unpreparedness of some segment of the Nigerian society to respect the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria vis-à-vis the provision for religious affairs especially the Islamic legal system. Yaro (1988:54) is of the belief that the ugly elements that habitually generate conflicts among religious adherents are arguments over 'faith' and 'worship'. These are often times anchored on political emancipation, economic benefit, local prestige, cultural diversity and psychological imbalance. Mbiti (1986:93) identified the major causes of discords among

adherent of the major religious groups in the areas of different moral requirements, initiation rites, marriage customs, offering connected to the dead, place of sorcery, evil magic and witch-craft, methods of dealing with diseases, misfortunes and sufferings.

Eliade (1987:68) observed that, while Christianity is viewed as a product of America and European imperialism, Islam is believed to have emanated from the dominative exploits of the Arabian traders. For instance, the immediate outcome of the political factor, for religious and political conflicts is the economic benefits, which the big wigs of society anticipate to gain, through grants that will mount up to their private purse if only they can profess allegiance to one of the political or religious factions. Some of them will even make up arms to see to the perpetual domination of one political or religious group over the others.

Sani (2007:57) further asserted that “differences over values such as ideology and religion have also been some of the major causes of ethnic and religious conflicts in the past”. A good example of this is the 2000 Kaduna religious conflicts which claimed many lives. The conflicts were allegedly sparked off by the protest against the implementation of Sharia legal system. This is because the Christians saw Sharia as an attempt to diminish the strength of Christianity. Over-zealousness of some religious devotees to their respective religions seems to have been making them to act in ways that are both immoral

and contrary to the ethics of religions. It has made them kill, maimed and destroyed all in the name of God.

Onah (1996:47) is of the view that the deep-rooted and stereo-typed misconception about religion has caused serious lack of trust among the various religious groups. The proliferation of sects and cults among the various emerging religious orders has continued to encourage stereo-typed misconception and prejudices. This is because these sects and cults provide a helpful lens through which to observe and analyze distinction between healthy and corrupt religions.

Soyinka (1991:13-14) witnessing the sharp and mindless intolerance of Muslim worshippers who called for the removal of a cross, the Christian symbol of faith in the University of Ibadan Christian Chapel some years back remarked that: “Violence appears to be the one constant thing in the histories of the major religions of the world, a primitive aggressiveness violence – despite the lip-service which their tenets pay to the need for tolerance, peace and understanding”. The above scenario to Soyinka’s close friend, though not a Christian who was bitter and not happy with the development vowed that if the problem was not amicably settled between the Muslims and Christians, he was going to take a gun and shoot some one who will attempt removing the cross.

From the above expression, we can see that lack of tolerance of the beliefs and views of others, unguarded and provocative utterances or preaching by some religious leaders and their followers or even the use of loudspeakers

which produce unpleasant noise are some ways by which conflicts arise. Disagreement as a result of differences of opinion, misinterpretation and wrong perception between religious groups, blocking of roads by Muslims on Fridays during their prayers, unnecessary delays of non-Muslim passengers in commercial vehicles on roads for prayers, etc. could also be responsible for conflicts.

Usman (1987:24) looked at the manipulation of religion as another cause that makes those who feel oppressed to resort to religious conflicts as a way of expressing their grievances. Some tribes, groups and communities feeling alienated or unrecognized in the country, take their case to the government through religious conflicts. Sponsoring of religious conflicts between Christians and Muslims thus, becomes an avenue for some people to express their perceived marginalization to the government, taking an advantage of the uncordial relationship between Christians and Muslims in the country.

Okwueze (2001:157) observed also that Muslim leaders in the country have acted and made assertions which lend credence to the fact that Muslims in Nigeria are intolerant towards non-Muslims. This was exemplified by the assertion of Safi Jimba, a Muslim and a prominent lawyer in Ilorin on the controversial Sharia issue where he was quoted by Okwueze (2001) to have said that “it is either we have the Sharia or there shall be no constitution or even peace in this country”. Also, late Sheik Abubakar Gumi, a prominent Muslim leader asserted that “the progress and unity of human race mean converting

Christians and non Muslims to Islam”. These were all volatile statements loaded with intolerance. Okwueze is of the belief that Christians are not totally exempted from the issue of intolerance but they have been in most cases at the receiving end.

Another factor, according to Okwueze (2001) which, inflames intolerance that results to ethnic and religious conflicts in the country is government’s attitude. There has been a consistent and deliberate tilt of government policy in favour of one religion. Typical examples include the Sharia and OIC issues. It was the government who encouraged the Muslims to insist on the inclusion of the Sharia in the constitution and decided also to register Nigeria as a member of OIC. Archbishop Okogie who was so disappointed by such government attitude was reported to have asserted that “government is promoting Islam”. Government reaction at the time of conflicts is hardly swift. The laxity therefore suggests involvement.

While some people think that Christianity is an agent of American and European imperialism, others think that Muslims have close ties with Saudi Arabia. Both religious bodies are believed to often get financial support from their applications.

3.3 Poverty/Unemployment

Poverty is said to exist when people lack the means to satisfy their basic needs. The poverty level in Nigeria today constitutes a great threat to the nation’s peace and security, particularly with the condition of living standard

declining daily. Poverty has been identified as one of the major causes of ethnic and religious conflict and the prevailing social and political ills bedeviling the nation. The poverty level most especially in the Northern part of Nigeria contributes to the high frequency of the ethno-religious conflicts in the North.

Physical poverty creates societal problems particularly when many people can not afford needs like shelter, clothing and feeding. Since Nigeria lack structural economy to cater for large population, the consequent poverty creates societal problems. Extremely poor people can do anything to sustain themselves. Thus, the poor youths (*Almajiris*) particularly in Northern Nigeria are manipulated with small amount of money and food to cause religious conflicts.

Aminu, K.D. (interviewed: August 2, 2010) a civil servant in Kaduna observed that there can be no peace when a lot of people are wallowing in abject poverty. An 'idle mind said Aminu, is the devil's workshop'. He therefore suggested that government should urgently do something so as to keep people busy in one way or the other and to reduce poverty to the barest minimum within the Nigerian society. He therefore called on government to live up to its responsibilities of educating all stakeholders in critical decisions on sensitive matters.

Moronike, O. (interviewed: August 4, 2010) a Post Graduate Student of Accounting, ABU, Zaria, attributed the causes to these conflicts in the north to selfish interests. According to her, although interest might be so fundamental,

sometimes, they would look selfish. For instance, if people are hungry and lack jobs and the prospects of tomorrow do not look so good, in that case, you could blame the government. However, the only way to end these conflicts is to create employment opportunities and education for the masses.

Biodun, A. (interviewed: August 4, 2010), an Evangelist in Zaria blamed the conflicts on low level of education among the youths who are always and easily used by mischief-makers to foment trouble for their selfish ends. He further observed that children are left on the streets without proper education. He therefore, said that, unless positive steps are taken to address the educational problem of our children these conflicts would continue.

A further study of other different views and opinions of scholars and authors from written texts, journals, magazines, seminars and conference papers also reveal quite a lot on the causes of ethnic, religious and political conflicts in the country. For instance, (Ngwoke, 1981:68) observed that, some people blamed the conflicts on the lack of adequate understanding and absence of sound doctrines within various religious groups. Others simply hinge the causes on fundamentalism, whereas others view it in the light of bad leadership within the religious groups.

Unemployment and poverty have been named also, as remote; and at times the immediate causes of ethno-religious conflicts. Sani (2007:51) asserted that: The unemployment of our willing and able youths has a translate security

implication for the country. These jobless youths have on several occasions been manipulated by the economic and political elites.

According to Sani, when the Kano protest by youths degenerated into violent crises in protest against the United States aggressive policy against Iraq and Afghanistan in 2002, a highly placed government official in the person of the then Kano State Deputy Governor, Abdullahi Ganduje, observed that hundreds of unemployed youths took the advantage of the anti-United States protest to unleash havoc and destruction on innocent citizens. That thousands of jobless youths are always waiting for any slight opportunity to ignite violent crises where they kill and maim innocent lives and loot property.

(Elaigwu, 2004:24) who also looked at poverty as one of the causes of conflicts reported that:

Conditions of life are currently very hard for the average Nigerian. Eating poses a real problem, not to mention taking members of our families to the hospitals. Many families can no longer pay school fees. There are no jobs for even those who have graduated from secondary schools, colleges of education, polytechnics and universities. There is a large army of the unemployed ready to be used for odious jobs which bring some income. Breaking and looting of shops during religious crises, armed robbery, political thuggery, banditry and other forms of crimes have virtually been 'legitimized' by the logic of imperatives of survival.

The poverty level of Nigeria according to Elaigwu, is very alarming and it only reflects the level to which the Nigerian masses have suffered economic deprivations and injustices in the form of exploitation. Yet, there is lack of

enough incentives on the part of government for poverty alleviation. This has therefore been another major cause to these crises in the country.

Given the current economic hardship and high level of unemployment, “armed youths for hire” are available at cheap cost. While the federal government “deregulates” the economy, politicians “deregulate” violence and the control of instruments of violence, which is supposed to be the monopoly of government. A hungry man easily turns out to be an angry man, and the use of these weapons can be dangerous to the state. The armies of the unemployed are always willing to find new jobs as body guards, assassins, and cannon-fodders in communal violence. The conspicuous consumption of political office holders (whose backgrounds were well known before they assumed public offices) amidst the abject poverty of the people, not only alienate, but generate hatred.

3.4 Poor Security Network

Vincent, D. (interviewed: August 13, 2010), a civil servant in Lere Local Government of Kaduna state attributed the causes of religious conflicts to inadequate or poor security network. According to him, government does not provide security at the right time during crises. He therefore suggested that preventive measures should be put in place by government so as to prevent the frequent occurrence of conflicts in the affected states and the nation at large.

Kolawole, C. (interviewed: August 13, 2010), a contractor in Lere town is of the belief that some well meaning individuals used the masses to fight themselves for their selfish ends. He therefore advised government to always

bring out such people and be made to face the full rot of the law to serve as a deterrent to others.

In potential conflicts situations security agencies may be useful in creating a sense of safety and security among groups. The partisanship of security agencies usually tips the balance, resulting in lack of confidence in the security agencies. Thus instead of preventing violent conflict or effectively controlling conflicts, the perception of the security agencies as neutral arbiters are known for, there have been allegations of partnership of security agencies which have helped to escalate rather than dampen conflicts.

3.5 Political causes

Elaigwu (2004: 15-19) asserted that there is enough evidence to show that quite a number of ethno-religious conflicts are caused by politicians and political leaders. The level of hypocrisy among our political leaders is nauseating. Some of these politicians have no constituencies from which to demonstrate their relevance except through their narrow ethnic and religious groups. Without being religiously judgmental, they are not religious in their personal lives-whether they claim to be “born again” or is it “born against” God. Their personal lives do not show that God has a place. They exude religious bigotry and ethno-centrism, with demonstrable arrogance. They symbolically use churches and mosques as their theatres of operation in the day time, while they consult *babalawo* or *juju men* or even ritualists at night. It is important that they maintain this semblance of churchianity and mosquianity,

bereft as these may be of the core values of Christianity and Islam. This is because it is their lifeline for survival. They pollute young children with their bigotry and copiously exhibit ethno-centric arrogance. Many of the ethno-religious conflicts in the North are generated or exacerbated by these groups. Since no commission of inquiry ever punishes them, they hide behind their ethno-religious curtains as untouchable-constantly brewing and dispensing new forms of violence. Genuinely religious people respect the ways of life of others.

Bonnet, A: (interviewed: August 18, 2010) a Sociologist, attributed the genesis of ethno-religious conflicts in the north and the country at large on the colonial masters who taught Nigerians to know that a Hausa man is different from a Gwari or a Kataf man is different from an Igbo man or an Igbo man is different from a Yoruba man, etc. According to Bonnet, the colonialists succeeded in dividing various tribes against one another in the country so that they could rule us easily. They in fact, succeeded because Nigerians were ignorant of their plan.

It was so unfortunate that at the time Nigerians got to put things in order and come together as one people and a strong country, the politicians made matters worse. Today, some of the conflicts in the country and in our various communities are for economic survival. Since we all know that lands belong to our communities or our fore-fathers, communities are now at each other's throat at any slightest encroachment. Instead of discussing the matter through the

elders of the affected communities, many idle youths have taken the laws in their hands with the assistance of some politicians.

Bonnet further stated that the Nigerian government has failed to provide the necessary basic amenities to the people or is not doing so quickly enough. The people in these communities that are killing each other in the name of ethnic, religion, land and political issues are peasants who cannot boast of any basic amenities in their areas. Bonnet said that he is of the belief that if government has been living up to its expectation, he does not think if people would be senseless to start fighting or killing each other over land or religious issues. He therefore suggested that government should ensure that necessary basic amenities are provided to the people, employment opportunities created to the country's youths who are idle and roaming the streets of our major urban centres and villages.

Bonnet did not spare the country's religious leaders. According to him, the country's religious leaders also have their share of the blame in this matter of ethno-religious conflicts. Many of them claim to be holy, when they are in fact devils in religious garb, and they mislead their followers to think that apart from their religion there is no other. What the religious leaders should know is that if God had wanted all human kind or people of the world to be Muslims only or Christians, it could have been so. Bonnet therefore called on government to take a serious stand towards bringing these conflicts to an end as

they posed serious threats to the mutual co-existence of various tribes and communities in Kaduna and Plateau States and the nation at large.

Donatus, I. (interviewed: August 11, 2010), a trader in Kafanchan accused the Kaduna and Plateau States government of aiding and abetting conflicts in the States. Donatus is of the opinion that lack of the States government action against the perpetrators of the conflicts always sent wrong signals to the trouble makers. He further maintained that the government is not courageous to fish out and punish those behind the crises either because they are in support of what is happening or because those behind these crises are close government associates.

Musa, I. (interviewed: August 11), an Islamic Cleric in Kafanchan blamed the conflicts on the isolation of religion from politics. In his opinion, political parties should be formed on the platform of religions so that those who are in support of Sharia will vote for Sharia Legal party. And those who are in support for canon law will vote for that. According to Musa, it is only through that exercise the smuggling of religion in to politics will be put to rest there by bringing an end to religious crises in the country.

Waziri, A. (interviewed: August 13 2010), a civil servant in Lere blamed ethnic and religious conflicts on government lack of proper mobilization of the citizenry. He therefore called on the government to properly mobilize Nigerians for national integration and mutual understanding, so as to prevent the ugly occurrence of these ethno-religious crises in the Northern part of the country.

Billy, G.R, (interviewed August 15, 2010S) a graduate of Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, in Kachia Local Government attributed the root causes of conflicts in the North to commercialization of politics. According to Billy, politicians who cannot easily have their way will always sow the seeds of trouble to cause confusion in their respective States so as to achieve their aims. Billy further observed that the northern part of the country is full of crises and that unless government takes steps to nip the incessant crises in the bud, they will continue to occur. He also called for a re-orientation of the people to support national goals and aspirations.

Maiwada, A. (interviewed: August 20, 2010), an Islamic Religious Scholar observed that the current ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna and Plateau States is a replica of what is happening among the Nigerian law makers. According to Maiwada, many Nigerian law makers are at each other's throat. That is how Nigerian politicians are always struggling to outwit each other either by hook or crook, and this has been the attitude they take to their various communities and wards. Maiwada further questioned that, how do we expect peace to reign in Nigeria where the legislatives during the Obasanjo's eight year and Yar'Adua/Jonathan administrations were not at peace with the executive? And now, how do we expect peace still to reign in Nigeria when clerics of Christianity and Islam are busy indoctrinating their followers that apart from their own religion, none is good. A careful look at the life of Pastors and Imams in the views of Maiwada hardly convinces someone that they are living up to

what is written in their holy books (Bible and Qur'an). This shows that we have serious problems in this country.

Maiwada therefore called on the country's government to do all it can to control such conflicts in our nation. He called on the practitioners of the two religions (Christianity and Islam) to cultivate positive attitude of live and let live for the sake of lasting peace in the country.

Linus, M. (interviewed: August 24, 2010), a Legal Practitioner in Kafanchan blamed the ethno-religious conflicts in the country on government who give preference to one religion over another. According to Linus, religion is a personal thing between man and God, but when government gives priority attention to one religion, there will be problem. This is because the followers of the favoured religion will start claiming superiority over the other, thereby posing serious threat to peaceful-coexistence. He therefore, called on government to give equal recognition to all religions for the sake of lasting peace in the country.

Adamu, W. (interviewed: February 15, 2011), a Media worker who claimed to have been following unfolding events and general life situations in the country particularly in Plateau State said that: The conflicts in Jos have been caused by the military government in their attempt to placate the Hausa/Fulani extraction, by making them hegemony in the geopolitical milieu at the Plateau. The Hausa/Fulani ethnic group had realized its social status in Jos for some time, without necessarily making any claim or struggling towards capturing state

power. However, when the military started orchestrating its plan for the Hausa/Fulani to capture local power, it was inevitable that what will follow would be years of conflict.

Okafor, D. (interviewed: January 15, 2011), a business man in Jos North Local Government blamed the incessant conflicts in Jos Plateau on the failure of leadership at the Federal, State and Local Levels. He however still observed that we Nigerians seem to have imbibed a culture of self-destruction. According to him, Nigeria is so lucky that natural disasters that occurred in countries like China, Haiti, Pakistan, Japan and other countries hardly occur in Nigeria. Rather God blessed the country with abundant human and natural resources but being that we are so foolish, these resources are not harness judiciously for our own use; rather we consciously create disasters for ourselves. Okafor further observed that:

It is really crazy and scary the kind of man-made catastrophes which Nigeria and Nigerians bring upon themselves, the agonies are far-fetched than those caused by natural elements. In the South, it is militancy and kidnapping; in the North it is Boko Haram and recurrent ethnic, religious and political crises. For example, Christmas eve of December 24, 2010 was faced with what that could be described as pure terrorism when multiple and carefully planted bombs exploded in sequence and in various locations in Jos Killing, maiming and injuring innocent and law abiding citizens. For God's sake, what does one call that? He asked.

Okafor therefore, called on Nigerians to eschew bitterness and hatred among themselves and embrace peace. He further reminded Nigerians that we all have the opportunity to remedy our dire situation. With the ongoing

elections all Nigerian need to do is to vote in good leaders and the rest will be history. He therefore advised that, we must vote only credible leaders. We must vote leaders whom we believe can deliver Nigeria. We should not vote base on ethnicity, religion or regional sentiments. Rather choose leaders who are competent, experienced, selfless, trusted, result oriented and have the fear of God.

Joseph, A. (Interviewed: June 15, 2010), a Clergy man in Barkin Ladi Local Government of Plateau state blamed the conflicts on government poor attitudes and insensitiveness on the plight of the people. He said that he is of the believe that the way forward was for people to realize that violence profits no one and resolve to co-habit in peace. He emphasized that if government had the will to take decisive steps over the matter, especially in punishing culprits of violence, a way out could be found.

Chibuzor, M. (Interviewed: June 19, 2010), a business man in Lantang Local Government blamed governments inaction over past conflicts in Jos Plateau on the situation we now find ourselves. He said that people were forced to begin to defend themselves when government appeared to have failed in protecting lives and property. According to Chibuzor, for years in the city of Jos many people were killed, their property destroyed or looted and nothing was done. These encouraged perpetrators of the conflicts and they used the slightest opportunity to unleash fresh violence, so it became obvious to the victims that

they had to defend themselves. That is why the violence has been getting worse and as you observe, each new disturbance is often worse than the previous one.

Omar (2010:25) President of the Nigerian Labour Congress blamed the Jos conflicts on the failure of leadership. He said that:

That, the state government and the Federal government in particular which exclusively controls security agencies in the country allowed a recurrence of this massacre is a clear sign of failure of leadership. It points to the painful and tragic reality that our nation is treading dangerously the path to a failed state.

Comrade Omar, having condemned the brutal massacre of women and children in the Jos crises called on the then acting President, Dr Goodluck Jonathan to go beyond the sacking of the National Security Adviser Major General Sarki Muktar (rtd) by ensuring that all those behind the heinous crime are “expeditiously made to face the law”. The statement reads:

We condemned in strong terms the carnage and wanton destruction of lives and property during the previous Jos riots and called for a thorough investigation of those issues that had led to eruptions of violence in this once very peaceful and serene city which once universally symbolized love, mutual tolerance and tourism.

According to Omar, the congress is disturbed by the inability of both the Federal and State authorities to ensure the security of lives and property in Plateau State especially in villages said to be few kilometers away from Government House, and Ray-field Jos. Given the frayed emotions and fragile nature of security due to the previous riots and particularly the very recent ones the appropriate authorities ought to have put in place very stringent security mechanism for monitoring movements in all nooks and crannies of the state or

have in place a prompt response system to any sign of breach of security in all settlements.

The congress therefore urges the new National Security Adviser and the Plateau State Government to brace up to the challenges of restoration of peace so that residents of the state and their relations elsewhere will have peace of mind. It also called on governments at all levels to make security of lives and property a prime objective of governance. The congress also viewed that while religious or ethnic differences may have been the apparent reasons for the recent mayhems, the greatest contributing factor to rampant cases of breakdown of law and order is the manipulation of religion and ethnicity for political ends. It therefore urges all those in positions of authority to commit themselves to the core ideals of leadership in line with universal concepts of governance so that majority of the people who presently serve as foot soldiers of violence would be engaged in productive ventures (*The Nation*, March 22, 2010).

Bolawole (2008) blamed the 2008 conflict in Jos Plateau on the state government and on the insensitivity of the then Plateau State Independent Electoral Commission for announcing the then conducted Jos North Local Government election results at the height of the crisis. According to him the Commission should have allowed the situation to calm down before announcing the election results. Bolawole further opine that:

The conflict in Jos is certainly a political one as people and groups jostle for power and control of the Jos North Local Government Council. Let me tell you that whoever occupies this office has a

say in the affairs of the State. This place is a stage where political parties, ethnic and religious groups try to show their worth (...). The hottest competition at the moment however is between the PDP and the ANPP. Sincerely, this role of ethnic and religious mobilization is just a chameleon tactics to ensure that political bigwigs in the state continue to control economic and political power.

Pam (2008) however, argued that if the conflict in Jos Plateau were purely political how come churches, mosques and clergy were attacked and killed? Why were politicians and political party officers and offices not attacked and killed if it was a political conflict? Why were the big premises and property of innocent civilians destroyed? The response according to Pam meant that the conflict was not political but a premeditated act under the guise of election. Alamu (2000) who had followed the unfolding events in Jos Plateau stated that:

I have followed the crises in Jos for some time now. A lot of people argued that violence and mayhem in this place is a political issue. However, based on findings and anecdotal evidence, I can confidently assert that this conflict is a religious matter. When churches are burnt down mosques are destroyed and religious symbols are embellished, how can you say that this issue is only political? My assessment of recent happenings in Jos shows that religion has become the most potent and lethal weapon for mobilizing people not only to protect their religion, but even to control the machinery of the government.

Furthermore, in his paper entitled “Religion and State Failure in Nigeria”,

Kukah (2000) remarked that:

The persistence of religious crises in Nigeria has very little of anything to do with the religious colouration of the leader. What can be said is that the crisis of legitimacy of leaders themselves has meant that religion has been constantly employed for selfish ends by politicians to make up for their legitimacy. The uses of the instrumentalities of religion and ethnicity have succeeded in

endangering the conflicts in Jos because the systematic impoverishment of the people in the area has made them too vulnerable to ethnic and religious manipulation.

Ahmed (2008:22) asserted that: The 2008 Jos North Local Government conflicts, even though may not reflect a radical shift from the 2001 crisis, still mirrors the extent and level by struggle for control of the political and by extension economic resources in a prebendal, decadent and unproductive African state. According to Ahmed, the crises that began as an electoral dispute quickly snowballed into an ethnic and religious conflagration with grave consequences for life and property. It stemmed from a longstanding battle for control of political power and economic rivalry between different ethnic groups and between those labeled “indigenous” or “non-indigenous” inhabitants of the area. As grievances build up over time, appeal to religious sentiments was used by both sides to manipulate popular emotions and eventually to inflame the situation to a level where it could no longer be controlled. Christians and Muslims, “indigenes” and “non-indigenes”, became both perpetrators and victims.

Omolade (2002:12) remarked that the causes of the conflicts may be as different as the outbreaks of the wild disturbances but the most fundamental is the nurtured suspicion and quest to stamp out injustice in the polity in all its ramifications and this have suddenly found outlet in the present democratic dispensation. The spate of the conflicts seems to suggest that they are instigated by certain groups dissatisfied with the status quo.

Bad leadership at both macro and micro levels according to Makarfi (2004:6) have played a major part in the escalation of ethno-religious conflicts particularly when adequate mechanisms to reduce their occurrence are not employed.

Makarfi(2004:6-7) further observed various other factors identified as potential sources of conflicts in Nigeria to include:

Land, Space and Resource availability, Dispute over Jurisdiction between traditional rulers, creation of Local Government Councils, ethnic and sectional competition over access to scarce political and economic resources, population explosion, pollution of cultural practices, social-territorial and political-economic inequalities and disabilities and religious fanaticism.

Uzor (2002:11) blamed the conflicts on the struggle for power. According to him, most of these crises may have started on religious note, but later exposed the political tensions that have been smoulding in the North. The struggle for power in Kaduna and Plateau States gave the ethnic and religion conflicts the bloody execution. Kukah (2002:18) blamed the conflicts on the continued manipulation of religion by leaders as a tool for governance. Kukah asserted that:

Leaders have realized the difficulty in trying to separate politics from religion; they have continued to manipulate this as a tool for governance. Whether we like it or not, this inseparable nature of religion and politics has also given people the right to be irresponsible, lawless, vengeful, violent and down-right hostile towards constituted authority.

Enwerem (1995:91) identified some other two causes of these conflicts as follows: First, that some people used these conflicts to advance their political interest, and so, they generate such conflicts either to make their political statements or to use them to mobilize people for their selfish political interest. Secondly, that some rich people exploit the problem of poverty affecting the poor citizens by providing them with funds in order to promote such conflicts for their selfish ends.

Akpokpari (2004:243) remarked that:

The absence of good governance is at the root of the crises in Kaduna and Plateau states. Good governance as “a system of administration that is democratic, efficient and development oriented has remain illusive in Africa as legitimacy has been determined not by democratic process but largely by ascriptive and patron-client relations while corruption has remained pervasive”. In the absence of good governance, the ruling elite recourse to ethnic, religious and regional appeal thereby inflaming primordial identities of the masses.

According to Akpokpari the solution to the incessant ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna and Plateau States can only be guaranteed by a leadership that is transparent, accountable and rises above primordial identities and enhance the peaceful coexistence of the different religious groups in Kaduna and the settlers and indigenes in Jos Plateau

Often, given the competitive setting among ethnic and religious groups, you need fairness, justice and equity. In the struggle for the control of government policy if one group has an ascendancy, government decisions may not favour the other group. The aggrieved group in the absence of fair avenues

for seeking redress goes violent. Thus the creation of local government councils, the location of local government headquarters, the siting of government projects as well as even the building of roads, can generate violent reactions, which utilize ethnic and religious bases for mobilization. Thus, the perception of government policies by the various groups in a polity could generate ethno-religious conflicts.

The creation of twelve states in the country created new sets of problems. Like all political actions, the creation of states had its political rashes. The first is the emergence of new boundary problems. While these intra-communal boundary problems were intra-regional and intra-state, they suddenly became inter-state, and therefore took on higher saliency. The Tiv-Jukun conflict over boundary and land, for example, were transformed from an intra-state to inter-state conflict, after the creation of Benue and Taraba States.

Similarly, in each new state, following additional act of creation of states, there emerged 'new majorities' and 'new minorities'. The new emerged majorities, who were old minorities, may be more vicious than the old majorities, thus creating new bases for conflicts in the new setting.

In addition, for the old North, the creation of States dealt a big blow to whatever remained of northern identity. The new states, especially from the old minority areas, buttressed by new and separate administrative and political identities, often opposed the resurgence of the old Northern identity. They clung

to their new found identity jealously, until some of these states started suffering from an implosion arising from internal competitive process.

Yahaya, A. (Interviewed: June 22, 2010), a student with University of Jos observed that dwelling on the past and trading blames would not solve the problem. He said that it was obvious that the accusations and counter-accusations which followed previous disturbances had not help. Hence, there is need to truthfully address the issues and resolve them. He however supported calls for a truth and reconciliation commission as opposed to an investigative body as a way out. In his words:

Every side will have something to say against the other and if we want to be honest, we have all wronged ourselves one way or the other. So the way forward is to work towards reconciliation and forgiveness so that we may begin to live as brothers and sisters again. Re-opening old wounds would not help.

Meshack, C. (Interviewed: August 5, 2010), a politician in Panshin Local Government Area of Plateau State stressed the importance of ending the carnage in Jos as it was adversely affecting business and development of the state generally. He said it was imperative to heal the old wounds and address whatever grievances the various parties might have towards achieving a harmonious co-existence. He suggested what he called the “Makarfi Solution”, a reference to the system adopted by the former Kaduna State Governor, Senator Ahmed Makarfi to resolve the frequent conflicts in Plateau State. He was optimistic that bringing the stakeholders to dialogue and conceding some things to one another would help.

3.6 Ethnic Migration/indigene-settler causes

Indigeneship and Settler Problems has become a problem all over the country. In spite of the rhetorics about Nigerian *citizenship*, all Nigerians recognize that there is *indigeneship*. President Obasanjo and his Vice President, Alhaji Atiku Abubakar has claimed that indigeneship is illegal. This problem cannot be solved by political hypocrisy and rhetoric. Yes, there have been patterns of migrations. But we all know the settlement pattern at this point in time. Even though the Hausa/Fulani have lived in Shagamu for over a hundred years, not many of them are in the local government council or in the Ogun State House of Assembly. In Abia, Enugu and Anambra States, Hausa-Fulani people have lived there for a long time, also not many are recognized as indigenes of any local government council area. In Kano and Adamawa States, many Ibos have also lived there for generations, but many of them are not recognized as indigenes. Even the names of individuals immediately disqualify them. Similarly, in Jos and Kaduna, many Yoruba families claim to have lived there for over four generations, but still they are not accepted as indigenes.

Every Nigerian can live anywhere in Nigeria, but not all Nigerians have the same indigene-ship rights everywhere political hypocrisy will not help us resolve this problem. We should rather be frank and realistic with ourselves.

The 1999 constitution, section 25-32, and the Part I, provides in item 9, that “citizenship, naturalization and aliens” is an exclusive matter of the government of the federation. Thus, any Nigerian can live anywhere in the

federation. Note that citizenship is not a concurrent matter as in the United States and other federations of the world.

However, many activities of government, and the constitution still remind us that we need an identity called indigene-ship. As an illustration, it does not matter how long a man has lived in Kaduna, his daughter who is admitted to the Federal Government College, is required to go to her local government to get a certificate of indigene-ship even though she has never been there. One can imagine for instance Miss Ngozi Okoro going to Yola and requesting for a certificate of indigeneship there, even if she was not born there.

Very often some citizens of ethnic and religious groups consider themselves as hailing from aristocratic traditional backgrounds, and arrogantly exhibit ethno-centrism in relations with other groups. At times, these people relate to other groups (that is when they care to) with disdain, extending their ethno-religious status recklessly to domains of other's socio-cultural preference. Politicians do this with nauseating efficiency. It is no wonder that traditional leader "sell" or "award" titles more under democratic polities in Nigeria. This often offends the sensibilities of other people who find other platforms for checkmating the nuisance of these leaders.

(Salha, M. Interview: November 13, 2010), a Traditional Leader in Wase Local Government of Plateau state argued that the failure to recognize the contribution of his people (the Hausa/Fulani) to the state and depriving them of certain rights were at the root of the conflicts. Salha made reference to how they

had been deprived of citizenship status despite the fact that their grand parents were born in the state and other alleged acts of injustice which he said could not but fuel disagreements.

Egwu (2009:15) acknowledged that ethnic minority consciousness in Jos Plateau State, has since the 1970s, been accentuated by the systematic construction of ethnic minority political identity in the “Middle Belt” based on the lived experience in the erstwhile Northern Nigeria and the general perception of the Nigerian State. It is a consciousness based on the perception that the indigenous ethnic minorities have long been dominated by the Hausa/Fulani community in the control of commerce and politics in which the former had been reduced to spectators. This is apparently a reference to the fact that the Hausa/Fulani community has always occupied a pre-eminent position in the social and economic life of the city owing to its early start. Even though this domination is not limited to the Hausa/Fulani community, the other groups such as the Yoruba and the Ibo do not stake similar political claims as the former. The traditional perception by the ‘Middle Belt’ elites that successive military regimes were firmly under the control of Hausa/Fulani elements and the ‘reckless’ manner in which military officers of Plateau origins were executed in the aftermath of the assassination of General Murtala Mohammed in 1976 contributed to the building of anti-Hausa/Fulani sentiments in the Jos Plateau (*The Guardian*, February 1, 2009:3)

In some parts of the North, especially in the Middle Belt area, there has been substantial migration in the last 20 years. In the context of competition for scarce resources and the importance of the control of the state for distribution of these resources, new lines of cleavages develop among groups. As indigenes organize for the control of their polity and economy, so do the settlers press for their rights of participation in these processes. Beyond a threshold, settler communities threaten indigene position of hegemony and control. While the settler gets *defensively aggressive* in its relations with the indigenes, the indigenes get *aggressively defensive*, often resulting in violence with the full mobilization of ethno-religious loyalty and commitment.

3.7 Constitutional violation

It has been observed that constitutional violation is one of the grey areas that have continued to promote religious conflicts in Nigeria. This has on several occasions prompted the call for a Sovereign National Conference because of the perceived marginalization of a section of the country, and also because of the Sharia and OIC issues, and power sharing among others. Government should therefore try to address all forms of marginalization, the Sharia and OIC issues once and for all. It should also discourage any tendencies towards secession and integrate groups that feel alienated into full political and economic life of the country.

In addition, unemployment into the Federal or State Public Services, the principle of “Federal Character” is applied. The Federal Character Commission

is expected to monitor these patterns of recruitment and call for corrections. In fact, forms for recruitment into public services also provide for an identification of one's religion.

As a federation, citizenship should be a concurrent matter under the constitution. Each state should have a residency requirement, given the laws of the state. A state could provide that if you have lived for 15 or 25 years in the state, or if you were born there and contributed to its development, you should be given a certificate of indigeneship and entitled to all the privileges of a citizen. However, this means that you cannot carry your family in truckloads to your original village for census exercises or elections. You have a new base of territorial identity. Let us be honest with ourselves. We cannot eat our cake and have it. We cannot run a federal system and run away from issues of dual identities.

3.8 Electoral Malpractice and Political Intolerance

Leaders who are not genuinely elected lack legitimacy. These leaders only know themselves. Nigerians must avoid electoral malpractices. Election rigging is an evidence of democratic deficit which replaces the people's mandate.

The level of political intolerance is amazing even within the same political party. Nigerian political, religious and traditional leaders must learn to interact and dialogue with one another so that their followers can pick up the signal. Political leaders should avoid the current winner-takes all in the

country's political terrain. Each State and Local government must establish power-sharing arrangement to accommodate various ethno-religious groups.

Given the perception that the control of state power is important, groups often decide which political platform is the best for the pursuit and the promotion of their interests. Thus, politics in Nigeria is not game but a battle. Nothing wins much as success, and nothing fails as much as failure. The political exclusion of political failure has been a major source of conflict.

In addition, the blatant rigging of elections-as done in 2003/2004 and 2007 if I may add creates a reservoir of ill-will for the so-called winners. Seeing no prospects of peaceful change, the aggrieved often take the violent route. Even the judiciary could not, in such circumstances be trusted. Similarly, the political intolerance of members of political parties generates intra-party and inter-party conflicts. At times, ethno-religious support gets mobilized to achieve targets. In addition, the "Tarzarcemania" (or self-succession) of political incumbents generates conflicts as there are often zones or groups which are opposed to the self-succession of the incumbents. Electoral malpractices often offend the sensibility of those already dissatisfied with incumbent regimes.

3.9 Economic Causes

Onayeikan (2010:34) argued, not without some justification that:

The recurring violent conflict between the Hausa/Fulani settlers and the Beroms is not simply a matter of their religious differences, but that it has more to do with the competition for limited land and other economic resources in the area. Land and resources have been a major cause of conflict all over Africa and

have often led to ethnic confrontation and conflicts. In a situation such as that prevailing in the Plateau area where Fulani herdsmen are pitted in competition for land against the Beroms, an indigenous group that is largely agrarian, the eruption of ethnic conflicts all but becomes inevitable without the intervention of the state to ensure that the legitimate demands of both ethnic groups are made.

Therefore, in seeking to tackle the problem, Onayeikan feels that the federal and state authorities must demonstrate fairness to all parties concern. Open partisanship in support of one party can only aggravate the situation and make peaceful resolution of the conflicts even more difficult.

Many of the ethno-regional conflicts we have today are related to strategic nature of interaction among groups as they compete for scarce but allocatable resources. As the state or government, at all levels, becomes the main allocator of resources and also sets the terms for such distribution, government becomes also an object of group competition. Controlling government also means the control of resources and the power for their distribution. Thus, as groups contest for political power, ethnic and religious sentiments and loyalty get easily regimented for the achievements of goals. Yet ethnic and religious sentiments are issues of primordial identity with large emotive contents. Thus, often the contest for the control of state policy, produce religious and ethnic interests. These resources could be land for farmers, or boundaries for claimed lands or grazing lands. The creation of additional states heightens these problems in certain areas, especially in the north-central zone to where there have been recent migration and pressures on resources.

3.10 External Influence

Usman, M. (Interviewed: November 11, 2010), a Muslim Cleric in Jos North Local Government Area, though, not very optimistic believed that the problem in Jos Plateau was being orchestrated from outside the State. Usman said that the Christians and Muslims of whatever ethnic background had lived together peacefully for several years until ‘outside’ influences began to emerge. According to him “We had no problem until some forces from outside began to put ideas into the heads of our Muslim brothers on the need to Islamize the State or agitate for certain rights and since then, we have not known peace”, he alleged.

3.11 Poor standard of education

Kukah (1993:24) stated that one of the reasons expressed generally by some Nigerians as the causes of religious conflicts in the North where this is common, is that the standard of Western Christian Education Civilization and the growing numerical strength of the indigenous Northern and Middle Belt Christians have continuously been a threat to the Northern – Fulani Islamic hegemony. This is because of their abhorrence of non-Muslim ruler-ship over them, with Muslims living in the fear that the Christians could one day take over the mantle of political leadership over them. This suits the interest of the members of Northern Hausa-Fulani Islamic hegemony, to continue the Jihad started by Usman Dan Fodio, revived by late Sir Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna

of Sokoto to Islamize Nigeria, in a religious ambition camouflaged and enrobed in political gab, tactically and cleverly packaged and disseminated.

3.12 Non implementation of Conflicts Reports by Government

Many people believe that the failure by government in the implementation of conflicts reports encourages the incessant ethno-religious conflicts in the country. For instance, Tobi (2009:18–21) commission of inquiry on the Jos Plateau 2001 civil disturbances made some observation and recommendation towards the controlled of the conflicts in the state but was not implemented. The commission's observation and recommendations amongst others include Eighteen (18) of the following:

- 1) That non-implementation by Government of the Reports of previous Commissions of Inquiry, and in particular the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the riots of April 12, 1994 in Jos Metropolis (the main features of which are very similar to the September, 2001 civil disturbances), was a sure recipe for a repeat performance of such disturbances. The Commission therefore recommended that Government should take seriously and implement diligently the recommendations of the Tobi Commission of Inquiry. As non-Implementation emboldens the perpetrators of the crisis and their sponsors to tread on the same path again and again.
- 2) Government should ban and enforce the banning of the blockage of public roads by both Christians and Muslims for prayers and other religious

purposes. The practice is illegal, oppressive to members of the public and creates unnecessary tension and acrimony among different religious groupings.

- 3) The use of loudspeakers mounted on the external walls of churches and mosques should be made illegal by a law of the Plateau State House of Assembly. The practice by any religious group causes annoyance and inconvenience to the adherents of other religions. The evidence before the commission shows that during the September, 2001 conflict, some religious bodies made use of such loudspeakers to mobilize their members to join in the killing of people of other faiths and destroying their properties, thus escalating the crisis.
- 4) The Jos Metropolitan Development Board (JMDB) should act on the Board Edict No.5 of 1974; to ensure that the indiscriminate construction of places of worship in residential areas of Jos and other towns is stopped. The practice creates inconveniences to residents and in times of crisis innocent residents become easy targets of religious bigots and fanatics.
- 5) Government should ensure that Alhaji Tijani Abdullahi's mosque at Congo-Russia, Jos where the crises started on 7th September, 2001 and which was destroyed during the crisis, is not rebuilt.
- 6) The Inter-religious committee has been shown to be very ineffective in its duties. It should therefore be-disbanded and in its place a new committee should be formed whose membership should include both Muslims and

Christians and which should meet more regularly. The persons to be appointed into the Committee must be persons who are not fanatics but persons of liberal minds, even if they do not hold leadership positions in their respective religion. Similar Committees should also be formed at the Local Government level.

- 7) Both Christian and Muslim leaders should be admonished through the inter-religious Committees to educate their members on the consequences of killing human beings or destroying their properties and on the need for religious tolerance generally. In particular, members of the Islamic faith should be educated on the true meaning of “Jihad” and the need to abstain from the use of derogatory language in describing the adherents of other religions for example, the use of the term “arne or arna” to describe non-muslims. This is provocative.
- 8) Government should encourage the establishment of inter-religious clubs in secondary and post secondary institutions through the Ministry of Education for the purpose of inculcating in the students mutual respect for each other’s religious beliefs Government should monitor the establishment of private schools and their syllabi with the aim of detecting and eliminating religious fundamentalism.
- 9) Government and the security agents should put in place measures that will check the illegal possession of firearms in the State. There was evidence before the Commission that arms were illegally stock-piled in the State

and these were freely used during the conflict. This should not be allowed to happen again.

- 10) Urgent steps should be taken by Government to fish out illegal aliens who are reported to be present in great numbers in the State. The evidence before the Commission showed that illegal aliens who have no stake in the well being of the State fuelled the September 1, 2001 conflict. The case of these aliens should be reported to the Immigration Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs for deportation to their respective countries.
- 11) Government appointments should only be made after consultations with the stakeholders as failure to do this has often led to misapprehension and disaffection among the people.
- 12) The sale of petrol outside the petrol filling stations should be banned and the Government should ensure that the ban is enforced. There was clear evidence before the Commission that because street hawking of petrol was commonplace, it was very easy for the youths who participated in the crisis to set innumerable properties ablaze.
- 13) The Hausa-Fulani Community should be encouraged to dialogue with other communities and accept the ownership of Jos by the Afizeres, Anagutas and Beroms. Anything short of that will not make for peace.
- 14) Government should do everything in its power to see that the security agents i.e. the police and the military, are always at alert and are able to

respond promptly to distress calls by individuals. In this way crisis situations can be effectively controlled before they get out of hand.

15) Religious fanatics should not be posted to head State Police Commands. In other words, Senior Police Officers who are fanatics either in the religion of Christianity or Islam should not be posted to head State Police commands; and here the criterion for fanaticism is that a senior Police Officer by being a Christian or Muslim has extreme beliefs or behaviour in that religion, or shows total bias for the religion to the extent that he exhibits very great and often unreasoning keenness for his religious belief, and he gives priority to that belief and not to his constitutional and statutory function of policing the State. We do not expect this as a written law oozing out a command but in the dossier of the Inspector General of Police. The Commission recommends that the Government sends this recommendation to the Inspector General of Police for consideration.

16) The Commission recommended that for his ignoble role during the September, 2001 conflict which resulted in the loss of thousands of lives, among other losses, the former Commissioner of Police, Plateau State Command, M.D. Abubakar, be advised to retire from the Nigerian Police Force, and in the event of his refusal to do so, he should be dismissed from the service. The Government should forward this recommendation to the Police Service Commission for consideration and necessary action.

17) The Commission recommended that the activities of the Jasawa Development Association be suspended for a period of two years from the date the Government accepts these recommendations, for its persistent heightening of ethnic tension in Jos North Local Government Council. If during the period of suspension the Association does anything that could cause a breach of the peace, Government should have the option of proscribing it.

18) To improve the effectiveness of the Police in conflict management and control, the Commission recommended that urgent steps be taken to equip the police force with adequate facilities such as modern communication equipment, teargas, arms and ammunition, transportation and other logistics. The police should also be properly trained to handle crisis situations (*Insider*, March 2, 2009:18-21).

The researcher believes that if the above recommendations were implemented it would have gone a long way in control of the incessant ethno-religious conflicts in Plateau State. That would have also sent a strong warning signal to other states in the northern part of the country.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE EFFECTS OF ETHNO-RELIGIOUS CONFLICTS ON DEVELOPMENT IN KADUNA AND PLATEAU STATES

Plurality of ethnic and religious group ideally should not be a problem for they are parts and parcel of societies. Diversity and pluralism are known to be the basic of cosmopolitan and complex societies and other cultures such as ours in Nigeria but Kaduna State in particular. However, the management of these factors by socio-political systems and controllers of political power often breed sectarian and other conflicts. The multi ethno-religious nature of the society should not be a problem. That will be a problem only when ethnicity and religion are made means of narrowing people's participation in social, economic and political spheres in various forms.

The last two and half decades (80 – 2010) witnessed a resurgence of violent religious conflicts in Nigeria with obvious and severe consequences on political instability, low economic development, negative international image, break down of social order and heightened mutual suspicion between Christians and Muslims. These have led to the death of hundreds of thousands of people. In fact, the conflicts have impacted negatively on every aspect of life. That is why Sani (2007:194) stated that:

The conflicts have impacted negatively on political, social and economic development. Religious fanaticism affects or limits social interaction and harmony... These have also affected the social components of associations as exemplified by the situation

in Kaduna where there is sharp segregation of restructuring of the town in settlement by people along religious and ethnic divides.

From the foregoing, we shall now look at the negative social, economic and political effects of ethno-religious crises on Nigeria (Kaduna State in particular).

4.1 Social Effect: According to Ibrahim (2002:9):

The year 2000 Sharia crises in Kaduna created acute insecurity among Christian's minority groups in the State. They feared that the new legal regime would affect them adversely, despite claims to the contrary by the Muslim supporters. Indeed many voices on both sides called for partitioning of Nigeria rather than the adoption or abandonment of Sharia legal system.

From the observation and opinions of many, ethno-religious conflicts have resulted in the destruction of property and death of several of hundreds of thousands of people, men and women. The conflicts have resulted in the irreparable loss of human resources that could have been used for developmental purposes. The sad elimination of the breadwinners of such families led to increase in begging, prostitution and unemployment. Sadly still, where both parents were eliminated, the children (boys or girls) were forced to assume parental roles at tender ages which also have its negative social implication. In most cases the wounds left in the psyche of these people might not be obvious, but are often said to be mentally, psychologically and emotionally far reaching. These children may grow up with their minds fixed on hatred and set for revenge. No meaningful social development can thrive under the circumstances of religious crises (Arukwe, 2004: 184).

4.2 Economic Effect: Ethno-religious crises have also contributed to the weakening of the nation's economic development. The statistical breakdown of personnel and material resources wasted in Kaduna State alone can in a glance give insight into what Nigeria has lost to ethno-religious crises. Ahmadu Bello Way, Kaduna, by all standards is one of the most beautiful streets in Northern Nigeria that houses business shops and political offices. Car Malls and financial institutions equally jostle for accommodation along the road. A peaceful protest march by Christians against plans to adopt Sharia ignited violence and carnage which turned out to be the worse in the history of the State and the nation in general (Tell, March 13, 2000 p.14).

The material and human resources wasted from February 20 to 24, 2000, include, many shops, which were burnt down by the rioters. About 300 houses and shops at the Abuja junction Garage, Charity Hotel and Rakiya Memorial hospital as well as Magistrate Court were destroyed. Forty-five fuel tankers were burnt down. Not less than 200 houses were burnt in Barnawa located in the South Eastern part of Kaduna. Fifty business shops between Leventis roundabout and Katsina road were burnt down. Fifty million naira worth of goods in Labaran Ali Electronics Store were burnt down and about sixty million naira Electronics and building material shops on the same Ahmadu Bello road were destroyed. Vehicles worth millions of naira and constituting means of livelihood to some people were also destroyed during the crises. For example, Ikara Motors lost about fifty assorted fairly used cars, buses and trucks each

valuing not less than ₦350, 000. In Television Garage, Kaduna, 18 vehicles were destroyed and at Abuja junction Garage, 51 vehicles were also destroyed. Many churches, 123, 50 mosques and about 1000 houses were also burnt down at Tirkania – Nasarawa, Ungwar Muazu, Kabala West, Rigasa and along Lemu road in Tudun Wada, Kaduna (Tell, March 13th, 2000. 14).

The 2000 February ethno-religious crises in Kaduna did not allow some foreign investors who came into the state to invest in the Agricultural sector to do so. Instead, they were abruptly ferried out of the State by security agents. The same crises led to the shifting of that year's Kaduna Trade Fair a week further. Despite the shifting, several foreign participants who had earlier indicated their interest to be at the fair hurriedly cancelled their participation. Kaduna State that was fast becoming an industrial centre suddenly lost that status. Also, to that effect, several direct air flight to Kaduna State and other States in the northern part of the country were cancelled. These crises made both local and foreign investors see Nigeria as no-go-area that is full of risk and uncertainties in doing business.

Ethno-religious crises discourage growth in the sense of industrialization. This is because; no businessman or industrialist would want to invest where the safety of their investment is not guaranteed (Arukwe 2004:181).

4.3 Political Effect: Ethno-religious crises have serious consequences on the nation's political development. It affects our democratic values and norms and also delays viable political transition and consequently decimates the aspiration

of producing a nation state. The Nigerian political evaluation has been characterized by periodic instability instigated mostly by the elitist manipulation of religion as a survival strategy. Religious membership and association rather than the political parties selected these candidates for elections.

These have also contributed to the electoral violence that we have witnessed in the past and in these recent years. For instance, in the 1964 general elections, the violence instigated led to the 1966 military coup and political instability, which culminated in the civil war. Yet, the violence occurred in 1983, 2003 and even in the 2007 general elections. These are obvious indications that politicians have not learnt any lesson from their mistakes of the past. Most politicians are particular about the issue of who takes what, rather than how democratic norms and values would be entrenched in the nation. The political future of the country depends on the level of which the various religious components can tolerate themselves. The religious polarization of Muslims and Christians poses serious challenges to democratization in Nigeria.

It is the obvious instability and deficiency in the democratic process that prompted religious and ethnic nationalism. It has resulted in the emergence of socio-cultural groups like Ohaneze, Afenifere or Oduduwa movement and the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF). These groups now act as political platforms to actualize the aspiration of their adherents. This has prompted Muslim fundamentalists craving to convert Nigeria into a theocratic state governed by

Sharia and also prompted Christian fanatics craving to convert Nigeria into a theocratic state governed by the Canon Laws.

The above craves according to researcher; by both Christians and Muslims have serious security implication for the waves of religious violence in Nigeria. Money is wasted on litigation and out of courts settlements. Funds are also wasted in mobilizing and sustaining security operatives and the proliferation of small arms. Arms are now getting into wrong hands. Some of these arms are legally imported or smuggled into the country, or are violently acquired from law enforcement agents. Realizing the security implication of these arms getting into wrong hands, made the Federal Government established a task force to work towards retrieving such illegal arms.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

5.1 Principal findings

Religious conflicts have been a major problem in the history of Nigeria. These conflicts have negatively affected the social, economic and political sectors in the last three decades (80 – 2010). During such conflicts, many lives were lost and properties running into billions of naira were lost.

Socially, the conflicts succeed in limiting social interaction and harmony between Christians and Muslims. These have also resulted into major religious restructuring of settlements or town with people congregating in areas where their religious faiths have majority of inhabitants in the Northern part of Nigeria. The crises have also resulted in the sharp increase in the number of widows and orphans leading to prostitution, begging, unemployment, etc.

Economically, the Nigerian economy is weakened particularly through the cost of investment by the conflicts in the affected States. The crises have also discouraged economic growth in the sense of industrialization and modernization as both local and foreign investors shy away from investing in the country.

Politically, the country is now divided along religious lines because of such crises. These have affected the voting and campaign patterns, democratic value and norms. The conflicts also delay viable political transition and consequently, the aspiration of producing a nation state.

5.2 Contribution to Knowledge

This research work stems a good tool of effectiveness for religious teachers and leaders. It is good particularly to those who instruct others to embark on self transformation. It is also a good source for character development. The research provides people with the relevant information about the root causes of ethno-religious crises in Nigeria. It serves as documented evidence that increases the awareness of religious leaders and their faithful and policy makers on the evil of ethno-religious conflicts in the country. The work therefore recommends for better policy formulations right from the local, state and national levels that would help in correcting issues relating to religious conflicts in Nigeria.

The researcher strongly believes that this work will help in strengthening the analytical and operational work of stake holders in the area of research, conflicts resolution and sustainable socio-economic and political development. The work provides some kind of scientific ways of managing ethno-religious and other forms of conflicts in the country.

5.3 Recommendations

Ethnic and Religious conflicts, undoubtedly, constitute a great impediment to the peace, stability and development of a nation like what has been going on in Nigeria. It also negates principles necessary for entrenching enduring democracy in the country. However, the knowledge of various factors which influence ethnic, religious and political conflicts and the requisite

mitigating policies are vital to policy makers and stakeholders in place and conflict settlement.

From the foregoing therefore, Sani (2007:202–217) identified eight factors, if properly handled would help in the control of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria. These include:

1. Literacy level

The level of literacy in the Northern part of Nigeria is low. This is because the North despite the vast resources at its disposal has not shown enough commitment necessary to turn around the educational sector. Regrettably, the zone has the highest school drop-out rate in the country. Most of these school drops-out in their bid to survive turn to menial jobs as means of livelihood. Some of these drops-outs eventually graduate to become miscreants in most cases that serve as the willing tools in many ethno-religious conflicts in the country.

Therefore there is need for government policy to place priority on the nation's educational development. The cling illiteracy equally requires special focus on Islamic education in Nigeria. The structure of the nation's Islamic schools gives room for religious indoctrination and inadequate acquisition of Islamic education from Islamic schools. There is also the need for modernization of the traditional Qur'anic school (Makaranta Allo) system of education, which would add value to the system in the process. This could be

done either by a complete reform of the system or its integration into the modern formal system of education.

President Obasanjo administration to some extent was proactive in policies aimed at promoting the educational development of the country. The implementation of Universal Basic Education (UBE), early child care and education, free launched for pupils in the nation's primary and junior secondary schools and the tackling of adult literacy through National Commission for Mass Literacy, Adult Literacy and non-formal education are indicative of such determination.

2. Religious Knowledge

Islam according to Muslims is a religion of learned people therefore; ignorance has no place in it. It is the only religion according to its teaching that demands knowledge as criteria for admission. Yet, many of the Islamic adherents suffer high level of illiteracy and ignorance of the religion. Most of the Islamic religious preachers lack deep knowledge and interpretation of the Qur'an, Hadith, Sunna and Fiqh. This makes many of them interpret the Qur'an according to their biases and passion. This contributes to the low level of literacy in the Qur'anic school thereby, leading to indoctrination of the pupils against other religions. This therefore becomes a motivating factor to those Muslim adults and youth who participate in most of the ethno-religious conflicts in the North. Today, Wanton arson, murder and destruction of

property are persistently going on in the North in the name of religion. This is because of the glaring inadequate knowledge of the religion.

To deal firmly with these conflicts therefore demands that government handles the hoodlums decisively according to the laws of the land, no culprit should be spared when caught committing such devilish acts during ethno-religious conflicts. That will serve as a deterrent to others.

3. Regulating Religion

As a regulatory measure, religious leaders should be screened, registered and granted license to preach. They must commit themselves to un-provocative and non-violence act while their constitutional rights to freedom of speech and association is guaranteed. Religion should be used to promote institutional integration instead of otherwise. Religion should be given its proper place in national life commensurate with our historical situation. It should be seen purely as the private affair of an individual based on his or her convictions, not forced on him or her.

Killing in the name of religion is a distortion of the message of God. There is the need for the reorientation of Nigerians, particularly among the youths. There is also the need for the review of the school curriculum so as to lay more emphasis on the application of religion to orientate the minds of young pupils. It is also necessary to incorporate peace study and conflict resolution as part of school curriculum. Pupils should be re-oriented to support national goals and aspirations.

4. Sports

Sports in Nigeria, particularly football, are one of the most potent instruments of national unity. In football, Nigerians are one and united irrespective of religious identity and tribal affiliation. Unlike other aspects of politics and governance issues in Nigeria, the composition of the national teams pays no respect to ethno-religious biases. Football undoubtedly, is a unifying factor in Nigeria. Players are viewed from all parts of the country as heroes and legends. Football stars and other sportsmen and women could, therefore, be used as agents of national unity and exemplary life of tolerance and cohabitation in pursuit of a common goal.

While Muslim and Christian groups could protest religious ratio rates in governmental appointments and even in the armed forces, Nigerians are united in use of merit in the selection and the composition of the national team. It is obvious that, in most instances, Christians from the Southern part of the country dominate the national football team, which does not bother Muslims in the North and elsewhere.

5. Arts

Arts are strong emerging factors that synthesize the consciousness of Nigerians of diverse faiths. The rising popularity of home videos cuts across all faiths and denominations. Nigerian home video has a strong influence on the lives of Nigerians; artists are revered and viewed with strong admiration even more than politicians and clerics. Their fame and pulling power could be

harnessed and exploited to promote the culture of peaceful coexistence, religious tolerance and elimination of hatred, hostility and civil strife.

6. Music

Music, its messages and messengers profoundly influence the millions of its listeners. In today's Nigeria, a popular musician is most likely to attract more spectators than a popular preacher would. With no barrier to age, gender and belief, music and musicians have overtime proven to be strong and virile bridges that cut across the hearts and minds of the Nigerian people. In an atmosphere of pleasure, with their songs and rhythms, musicians could influence politics and social life of the people. The recent resurgence of interest in Nigerian music by youths especially makes music a suitable channel for the attainment of national unity and harmonious coexistence.

7. Drug

The nation's primary and secondary schools have sadly turned out to be den of drug addicts and cultists. This has contributed to the rising incidence of crime in and out of the schools. The government, therefore, needs to empower the agency responsible for the campaign against these vices, so as to stamp them out of the society. Drugs have become a sort of solace for criminals and most young people in the North and other cities in the country. Drug taking gave them a false sense of accomplishment, ecstasy and protection, hence its continued patronage. Addiction to drugs hampers these young people's ability to reason effectively and show compassion in the process. Hence, at the

slightest provocation, they let loose their fury and resort to violence. Most of these drug addicts are usually from broken homes or those neglected or abandoned by their parents.

8. Probe Panels

Government should strengthen its machinery to enforce the implementation of probe panel reports, so as to prevent criminal impunity on the side of the offenders and their sympathizers. Regrettably, each time there is ethno-religious crisis; those who ought to have been prosecuted and tried and consequently punished for their roles in the crisis are always pampered. In some instances, people who committed grievous offenses like arson and murder were being protected and prevented from prosecution by their godfathers or prominent personalities. This gave the culprits further boost to perpetrate more heinous crimes in future. In treating the reports of the probe panel on any ethno-religious conflict, government should ensure that there is no sacred cow in the administration of justice.

9. Leadership

The role of good leadership in the prevention of ethno-religious conflicts cannot be overemphasized. This is why Professor Chinua Achebe in 1983, asserted that:

The problem with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian character. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land or climate, or water or air or anything else. Nigeria's problem is the unwillingness or

inability of its leaders to rise to the responsibility; to the challenges of personal examples which are the hall mark of true leadership.

The failure of leadership in Nigeria is responsible for the numerous conflicts witnessed in the country. Until when qualitative leadership is provided, peace may continue to elude Nigeria. A responsible, respectable and responsive leadership is indispensable in the nation's quest, not only for development but also for the sustenance of peace and promotion of national integration.

A self-serving leadership with a narrow socio-economic and political interest, characteristically appeasing the class of a privileged few and ostracizing the mass of the people through economic policies that dis-empower them, and entrancing socio-economic injustice, has by its conduct created a volatile atmosphere for all forms of conflicts. Successive government in Nigeria, whether military or civilian, had continue to retain social and political system that emphasized more on boosting the fortunes of those in government, and those with government.

Further recommendations towards controlling the incessant ethno-religious conflicts in the country include the following:

Education

Nigerian citizens irrespective of religious affiliation have a right to balanced and objective education. Respect for each other's religion must be inculcated in the citizens through sound education. Religion ought to help

engender good knowledge of other's religion particularly in a pluralist nation like Nigeria (Achunike 2007:12).

Government should consider it an urgent need for the provision of Western education along side Arabic education for the Northern 'Almajiris' so that they be denied being agents of religious crises in the country because they constitute a ready instrument for unleashing religious mayhem. Government should also demonstrate political will in the establishment and respect of the rule of law, which should dispense equal justice to the high and low. Any person or group of persons engaging in the promotion of disunity and religious crises should be identified and sanctioned with appropriate penalties.

Reconciliation

Government should set up an independent inter-religious council comprising of members from Christianity, Islam and the African Traditional Religion (ATR). The Council should be saddled with the responsibility of reconciling warring religious factions or groups in the country. This is important because, if the council is dependent on government, it may achieve little or no success. That is why we agree with Kukah (2003:41) who stated that "the National Council for Inter-religious dialogue set up by the Obasanjo administration was still dependent on the government." Kukah further asserted that:

The council continues to hold many meetings, but their practical outcome is minimal. The public really has no contact with what the council is doing. Moreover, the body is still being funded by the

Federal Government... It is difficult to say how long the council will last for and whether there are any plans in future for it to become independent and more assertive in addressing national issues. Its role need not be that of a fire extinguisher in times of crises, although it has so far failed to fulfill even that role. Properly handled, it can serve as a moral compass for the nation... Whereas the Christian leaders have independence and no links with government, the Muslims leaders are all appointed and funded by government. It is hard to get them to criticize government policies.

Dialogue

As rational beings, dialogue is a good and effective tool in solving ethno-religious crises. Sincere and open hearted dialogue becomes crucial when discussing religious issues. Christians and Muslims should all think more rationally, critically and appreciate the dignity of human person and the sacredness of life. They should also work together in the areas where they find themselves in order to improve on their lives condition, fight against drug abuse, prostitution, HIV and AIDS and so on. Dialogue is the gateway to achieving sustainable peace in our conflict torn society.

Government Sensitivity in Political Decisions

Nigerian government should be sensitive, fair and just in their decisions and policies. It is wrong for government to be a conflict – generator. Nor should government overheat the polity through hurriedly rehearsed and unthought-out policy because it suits the interest of a few people either in government or who have influenced over government. Good governance entails catering for the interests of the majority while protecting the interest of the minority.

Political Maturity in Leadership

Leadership is not all about privileges to loot public treasury or push personal interest to the disadvantage of the public. Leadership is responsibility, an obligation to demonstrate commitment, integrity, honesty and decency in handling the affairs of a heterogeneous group which chose some one as a leader. The speeches and utterances of our religious, ethnic, traditional and political leaders before, during and after ethno-religious crises clearly show that they do not have patience, understanding, honesty, maturity and tolerance, which are marks of good leadership. It is even worse when those leaders manipulate ethnic and religious` identity for their selfish ends. Mature leaders must treat their followers with respect and not talk down to them. They must encourage mutual respect even in contexts of vehement disagreement among groups.

We need a conference of all ethnic and religious leaders to discuss and also learn the values of tolerance and accommodation. This takes a long time to achieve, but we must not underrate it. We must start now. We can start this first at the State and Regional levels and then have delegations to a Northern Conference. Therefore, all State governments should host a State Conference on ethno-religious conflicts.

Mutual Respect and Recognition of Claim of Others

Most of the ethno-religious crises we have witnessed in the country emerged from the lack of mutual respect for one another. We can not all be the

same. We must realize that even within single religious and ethnic groups there are differences in perspectives and opinions. Disdain and arrogance (bankrupt of content) are often marks of inferiority complex (Elaigwu 2004:24).

Similarly as we earlier on mentioned, we must be able to dialogue with one another, no matter how difficult. We should respect and recognize the claims of others in a competitive context even if we disagree with such claims. Non-recognition of claims generates major conflicts, which often mobilizes ethnic and religious loyalties. Recognition of claims, while disrupting the nature of claims, creates a basis for discussion. Government can be helpful in mediating in some of these conflicting claims. It should not wait until the competitive process turns into violent interaction among claimants.

Improvement of the Economy and Management of Unemployment

Sincerely speaking, unless those in government are in a country different from ours, they should realize that conditions of life are currently very hard for the average Nigerian citizens. As earlier on observed, eating poses a real problem, not to talk of payment for families medical bills and children's school fees. There are no jobs for many Nigerian graduates. As a result there is a large army of the unemployed, ready to be used for odious jobs which bring in some income. Armed robbery, political thuggery, banditry and other forms of crimes have virtually been 'legitimized' by the logic of the imperatives of survival.

While reforms are welcome the human being should be object of reforms. It is not enough to mention that there are poverty alleviation programmes. The

truth is that most Nigerians experience since 1999 shows that these programmes are not properly thought-out programmes for poverty alleviation. At State and Local Government levels, we all know how the poverty alleviation funds are thrown down the drain – pipes. When programmes tend to contribute to poverty escalation rather than alleviation, Government would need to review its activities. Government also needs to address the issue of economy, poverty and how to check and manage unemployment if we are to control ethno-religious crises in the country.

Depoliticization of Ethnic and Religious Groups

Given the cost of violent ethno-religious crises in Northern Nigeria, it is clear that ethnic and religious groups need to be depoliticized. Politicians must halt the current trend of manipulating these two groups with primordial identities for political and selfish ends. Politics overtly radicalizes religion and ethnicity. An elaborate process of depoliticizing ethnic and religious groups must be put in place.

While the management of conflicts is important and continues in the lives of nation-states, it is even more important to put in place adequate mechanisms for conflict prevention. As earlier on discussed, it is important to realize that conflict prevention, management and resolution are cardinal functions of government and must be taken seriously.

5.4 Suggestion for Further Research

In spite of all that has been said and done on this research work, there is still much to be done on this topic (the affects of ethno-religious conflicts on the socio-economic and political development of Nigeria). However the researcher hereby suggests that further researches should focus on the following areas:

- a) The psychological effects of the ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria.
- b) How Comparative studies on religions with help to enhance better understanding of religious leaders and their followers.
- c) Conflict prevention and management of ethno-religious crises in Nigeria.

Conclusion

In conclusion therefore, the researcher believes that sincere governmental schemes and efforts must be established by government to achieve social and distributive justice for all people in the country. Merits, qualification and competence in or for a particular position must be respected. For where there is justice there will be peace and where is peace, there will be no ethno-religious conflicts. In fact, the control of ethno-religious conflicts in Nigeria will among other social vices like corruption, litany of politically motivated killings, prostitution, examination malpractice, kidnapping, terrorism, rigging of elections etc. will go far in moving the country forward.

A complete and total implementation of the above recommendations would go a long way in the control of the incessant ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna and Plateau States and in most of the northern states of the country.

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ORAL INTERVIEW

S/ N	NAME	STATUS	OCCUPATION	PLACE	INTER VIEWER	DATE
1	Adamu W.	-	Media Worker	Jos South LGA	John Yahaya A.	15,February 2011
2	Aminu, K.D.	-	Civil servant	Kaduna	John Yahaya A	2, August, 2010
3	Ansalem, I.O.	-	Business man	Kaduna	John Yahaya A	3, August, 2010
4	Bala, A.H.	-	Civil servant	Kaduna	John Yahaya A	7, August, 2010
5	Billy, G.R.	Student	ABUZaria undergraduate	Zaria	John Yahaya A	15, August, 2010
6	Biodun, A.	-	Evangelist	Zaria	John Yahaya A	4, August, 2010
7	Bonnet A.	Senior lecturer	Civil Servant	Kaduna	John Yahaya A	18, August, 2010
8	Chibuzor M.	-	Businessman	Lantang North LGA	John Yahaya A	19, June, 2010
9	Clara, N.A.	-	Business woman	Kafanchan	John Yahaya A	11, August, 2010
10	Donatus, I.	-	Trader	Kafanchan	John Yahaya A	11, August, 2010
11	Haruna, I.	Imam	Muslim Cleric	Zango Kataf	John Yahaya A	10, August, 2010

1 2	Hilary S.	Teacher	Civil Servant	Jos North LGA	John Yahaya A	15,June, 2010
1 3	Joseph A.	-	Clergy	Barkin Ladi LGA	John Yahaya A	15,June, 2010
1 4	Kolawole, C.	-	Contractor	Lere	John Yahaya A	13, August, 2010
1 5	Linus, M.	Lawyer	Legal Practitioner	Kafanchan	John Yahaya A	24, August, 2010
1 6	Maiwada, A.	Teacher	Islamic Scholar	Kachia	John Yahaya A	20, August, 2010
1 7	Meshack C.	-	Politician	Panshin LGA	John Yahaya A	5, August, 2010
1 8	Musa, L.	Imam	Muslim Cleric	Kafanchan	John Yahaya A	11, August, 2010
1 9	Mustafa, J.J.	Politician	Political member PDP	Zaria	John Yahaya A	4, August, 2010
2 0	Moronike, O.	Student	PG Student ABU Zaria	Zaria	John Yahaya A	4, August, 2010
2 1	Okafor D.	-	Businessman	Jos North LGA	John Yahaya A	15, January 2011
2 2	Peter, S.	Clergy Man	Pastor	Zango Kataf	John Yahaya A	10, August, 2010
2 3	Salha M.	-	Traditional Leader	Wase LGA	John Yahaya A	13, November, 2010
2 4	Usman M.	Imam	Muslim Cleric	Jos North LGA	John Yahaya A	11, November 2010
2 5	Vincent, D.	-	Civil servant	Lere	John Yahaya A	13, August, 2010
2 6	Waziri, A.	-	Civil servant	Lere	John Yahaya A	13, August, 2010
2	Yahaya A.	Student	University of	Jos North	John	22, June,

7			Jos	LGA	Yahaya A	2010
2 8	Yusuf, Y.A.	-	Civil servant	Kaduna	John Yahaya A	2, August, 2010

APPENDIX A

Research Questions

The following questions were used as a guide for obtaining information from those interviewed:

- a. What has been the cause(s) of many ethno-religious conflicts in Kaduna and Plateau States Especially since 1980?
- b. How have governments, NGOs, religious organizations/ institutions, groups and individuals helped in managing the conflicts?
- c. What has been the role of the security operatives in the conflicts control? Have they promptly responded to most of the conflicts in the two states under discussion?
- d. Does the alleged presence mercenaries from within and outside the country and the use of sophisticated weapons signal to a threat to the security of the two states and the country at large?
- e. What do you think has been the impact of these conflicts on human and material resources in the Kaduna and Plateau States and Nigeria in general?
- f. To what extent have these conflicts eroded mutual trust and confidence among indigenes and non-indigenes and groups in Kaduna and Plateau states?
- g. What have been the general implications of these conflicts on the entire northern states and the nation at large?

- h. How do you think these conflicts can be managed for the purpose of ensuring peace and harmony, socio-economic and political development of Kaduna and Plateau States and the country at large?